History and Circumstances Relevant to the Question of Peace

A just and lasting peace is possible only if the Filipino people’s demand for national liberation and democracy is satisfied. It is the outcome of the people’s revolutionary struggle. It goes without saying that the national democratic revolution is at once the struggle for a just and lasting peace. The strategic line of this revolution which is to complete the struggle for national liberation and democracy, is the same strategic line that the NDF has to pursue in seeking a just and lasting peace.

There can be no other strategic line. To say that the NDF does not have such a line in seeking peace negotiations is to suggest another line or to confuse the line. To engage in peace negotiations, without addressing the roots of the armed conflict and without seeking substantial satisfaction of the people’s demands for national liberation and democracy, is to create confusion and even fall into capitulation.

Peace negotiations may be conducted before the total victory of the national democratic revolution. If the success of these involve the truce agreement of the two contending sides in the civil war, for the purpose of uniting against a common foe or against a certain set of problems, there is a mutual adjustment of policies. But the NDF is not obliged to give up its firm revolutionary principles. Neither can the GRP be expected to change its counter- revolutionary principles.

Peace negotiations constitute only one of the forms of struggle in the overall struggle for a just and lasting peace. They may arise only because in the first place there is an armed conflict to deal with. They reflect and yet interact with the balance of strength in the battlefield. To obscure or to underrate the relationship of the battlefield to the negotiating table is to fly into fantasy, unless the “realistic” objective is to capitulate. Peace negotiations do not always necessarily arise between the two sides in a civil war. That they may arise depends on the strength and willingness of the two warring sides and on the concrete situation. An incumbent state power can refuse to negotiate peace because it thinks it can beat the opposite side in the battlefield. However, it is always willing to negotiate if the other side wishes to capitulate or can be tricked into capitulation. It can also use peace rhetoric in order to misrepresent itself as the just and reasonable side, split the ranks of the armed opposition and mislead the people.

It is known in history that quite a number of regimes have refused to negotiate seriously even when they are desperate or when they are about to be defeated. Even in such a case, the revolutionary movement must show that its position is just and reasonable, that it seeks a just and lasting peace, in order to gain more popular support at home and abroad and to isolate and defeat the side that stands for the violence of an oppressive and exploitative system.

Before undertaking peace negotiations, it is necessary for the Philippine revolutionary movement to study both the relevant historical experience and current circumstances in order to understand profoundly and pursue correctly the struggle for a just and lasting peace.

The Philippines has a deep and rich experience with regard to various types of armed conflict and peace negotiations. It is useful to review this experience and learn from it. We can only point to the most significant and relevant historical events.

Peace Negotiations in Philippine History

In precolonial times, the disparate communities in the Philippines engaged in trade and cultural interaction as well as in wars. Wars were settled either through the victory of one side and the defeat of the other or were negotiated through the mediation of a third party in the course of war or in its aftermath.

The peace process of the precolonial past can still be observed in certain areas which are not tightly integrated into the social and legal system dominant in the country. The revolutionary movement has understood this kind of peace process in the hinterlands and has often acted as the third party to assist in the peacemaking between conflicting communities and unite them against the Manila-based and the local forces of oppression and exploitation.

For instance, in the mountain provinces of Northern Luzon, the tradition of the bodong (peace pact) has been adopted by the revolutionary forces to settle tribal or communal armed conflicts and has acquired a national and democratic orientation.

Pacification by Spanish Colonialism

In the conquest of the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists used the divide-and-rule policy. They engaged in blood compacts and alliances wherever they could, and pacified one community in order to conscript troops to augment the few foreign troops needed to conquer and subjugate another community.

In the conduct of pacification, the Spanish colonial troops used armed force or threatened the use of it in order to suppress or discourage the resistance of the natives. The Spanish priests had the special function of persuading the natives that it was better to submit to than to resist colonial rule.

The sword-and-cross combination worked effectively while the native indios were still lacking in national consciousness. The Moros, the Igorots and other tribes could resist longer because of definite factors which favored resistance, like Islam as the rallying point of the Moros and the spontaneous tendency of the Igorots to unite against the uninvited foreigners and lowlanders and use their mountainous terrain to their advantage. The Sulu sultanate accepted Spanish colonial garrisons only in the middle of the nineteenth century. Some Igorot communities were subjugated only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The concept of local dialogues and community-based peace espoused by General Fidel Ramos through his peace and order councils or by the Coalition for Peace under the slogan of “zones of peace and zones of life” harks back to the pacification of the Philippine islands by Spanish colonialism. The colonial use of this concept of pacification is a much earlier tactic than that of denying the armed revolutionary movement of its mass base as in the US conquest of the Philippines and the use of “strategic hamlets” in the Vietnam war.

In the course of the protracted war between the Spaniards and the Moros through the centuries, there were interludes of peace negotiations and truce agreements. The Moros had the strength and dignity of being able to go into these because of their determined armed resistance. They were always ready to fight against the threat of total conquest.

The Pact of Biak-na-bato

Following the outbreak of the Philippine Revolution of 1896, the Spanish colonialists used both armed force and peace negotiations to end the Aguinaldo-led armed resistance of the Filipino people. As a result of the efforts of Pedro Paterno as intermediary, the first negotiations between the colonial power and the Philippine armed revolution led to the capitulation and exile of Aguinaldo and other leaders of the revolution under the Pact of Biak-na-bato in 1897.

In resuming the armed revolution against Spanish colonial power, the Filipino revolutionaries engaged in negotiations and cooperation with the United States. Subsequently, the US negotiated them out of advantageous positions in the siege of Intramuros and secretly negotiated with Spain the surrender of the Spanish forces to the US Eventually, the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, was forged strictly between the US and Spain.

In the course of the Filipino-American War, which started in early 1899, the US offered “peace” and “benevolent assimilation” to the Philippine revolutionary government. The “peace” offer induced a split within the Cabinet of the Philippine revolutionary government, resulting in the replacement of the Mabini Cabinet by the Paterno Cabinet and ultimately in the assassination of General Antonio Luna, the commanding general of the revolutionary army.

In conquering the Philippines and imposing its colonial rule on the people, the US combined the use of superior military force to crush the armed revolutionary forces and localized “peace” dialogues and agreements (with the assistance of the reactionary clergy) to recruit the local gentry into the service of US domination. The localized “peace” dialogues and agreements were always crowned with local elections dominated by the local gentry

While it was preoccupied with quelling the revolutionary forces in Luzon, the US went so far as to make a peace agreement, the Kiram-Bates Agreement of 1899, with the Sulu sultanate. After Luzon and Visayas were in the main pacified, it was the turn of the Moro people to be brutally conquered.

Upon the intercession of Dr. Dominador Gomez, Macario Sakay of the Filipino Republic placed himself and his forces in the hands of US colonial authorities in 1906 after an informal peace agreement. After a brief period of being feted and escorted by enemy troops, Sakay and his colleagues were tried and punished for “banditry.”

The Neocolonial Compromise

In Philippine history so far, the most successful negotiations regarding the fate of the entire Philippines have been those between the US government and the puppet legislative officials from the Nacionalista Party on the subject of changing the colonial status of the Philippines to a semicolonial or neocolonial one. Thus, in 1935 the Philippine Constitution and the transitional Commonwealth government and in 1946 the proclamation of nominal independence became possible.

To make the neocolonial compromise, the Nacionalista Party did not have to lead a people’s army and conduct a people’s war. Nationalist rhetoric, peaceful campaigns and missions to Washington looked sufficient. But in fact, the US took into account the revolutionary history and potential of the Filipino people and mass agitation for independence as well as the conditions of social unrest in the Philippines, in the US and in the world at large due to the great depression, the rise of fascist regimes and the need for an antifascist popular front in the thirties.

What is important for the colonialists, in agreeing to a neocolonial compromise, is that they retain their property rights and control of security forces even as national administration is handed over to the natives.

It was in the latter half of the thirties that President Quezon informally negotiated with Crisanto Evangelista and other detained leaders of the Communist Party for the legalization of the CP and cooperation in a “program of social justice” and in the antifascist struggle. With no objection from the US authorities, the representative of the Communist Party of the USA prodded Quezon to release the imprisoned CP leaders in 1936 and 1937.

Towards the outbreak of World War II, the merger party of the Communist Party and Socialist Party pledged its loyalty to the Commonwealth government and pleaded for the arming of the people against the imminent threat of Japanese invasion. The puppet government refused to arm the people.

The Japanese “Peace” Offer

In imposing its rule on the Philippines from 1942 onwards the Japanese fascists negotiated “peace” with all the available pre-war pro-US officials to shift their loyalty to Japan. If the pro-US officials were not available for one reason or another, the new foreign rulers recruited their own political puppets from the local exploiting classes.

After the arrest of the principal leaders of the CP-SP merger party in early 1942, the Japanese fascists sent out Guillermo Capadocia from prison to contact the other CP-SP merger party leaders for peace negotiations on the condition that his failure to return before the deadline would mean the execution of the imprisoned party chairman Crisanto Evangelista and the general secretary of the party Pedro Abad Santos.

Capadocia was arrested by the Manila-Rizal command of the Hukbalahap and was tried and subjected to disciplinary action by the CP-SP merger party for agreeing to be the messenger of the Japanese fascists. His failure to return to prison sealed the martyrdom of Evangelista and Abad Santos.

In the course of the resistance against Japan, the CP-SP merger party was able to build a people’s army, the Hukbalahap. But even before the landing of the US troops in late 1944, the CP-SP merger party decided to opt for parliamentary struggle and to convert the Hukbalahap into a veterans’ organization. This domestic political line would be reinforced by the international line of peace and democracy proclaimed by the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

Once More Pax Americana

In reconquering the Philippines in 1945, the US reinstalled its pre-war officials or set up provisional officials wherever the former were no longer available. It put into prison local officials installed by the revolutionary forces in Central Luzon.

Informally, Sergio Osmeña, the last president of the Commonwealth, accommodated the CP-SP merger party in the arena of parliamentary struggle and agreed to the alliance of his Nacionalista Party and the Democratic Alliance in 1946 elections, notwithstanding the bloody actions already being undertaken by US and local reactionaries against the Hukbalahap and the progressive movement.

After his electoral victory, Manuel Roxas as first president of the puppet republic was able to extract from the right opportunist leadership of the CP-SP merger party a commitment to surrender Hukbalahap arms and register Hukbalahap fighters. But the massive anticommunist campaign of terror against the people and the people’s army continued and the members of the Democratic Alliance elected to Congress were unseated in order to pave the way for the legislative approval of the Parity Amendment and other unequal agreements between the US and the Philippines. Nevertheless, through various devices, the merger party continued to plead for peace negotiations and forward peace proposals to the reactionary government.

The Quirino-Taruc Peace Agreement

Under President Elpidio Quirino in 1948, the reactionary government showed interest in negotiating with the revolutionary movement. The main negotiator of the government was Judge Antonio Quirino, brother of the President. With the approval of the leadership of the CP-SP merger party but without correct and clear explanations to the rank and file of the revolutionary mass movement, the commander of the Hukbalahap Luis Taruc engaged in peace negotiations in Hukbalahap territory with the Quirino government. An agreement was made on amnesty, surrender of arms and renewed registration of Hukbalahap fighters and reinstatement in Congress of the ousted congressmen from the Democratic Alliance.

The objectives of the CP-SP leadership in allowing Taruc to do what he did were to make propaganda and to try the road of parliamentary struggle. Undermining the stand and will of the revolutionary forces, Taruc and his kind put themselves above the armed conflict and premised the desire for peace on the claim that the people were tired of war and its costs. The CP-SP merger party also presented in 1948 to the Committee on Un-Filipino Activities of the Philippine House of Representatives a memorandum reiterating support to the Constitution of the reactionary government and declaring that the new democratic revolution would have a capitalist basis.

While the amnesty agreement was in effect, the troops and secret agents of the Philippine Constabulary could mingle with the fighters of the Hukbalahap and enjoyed safe conduct in the Huk-controlled barrios of Central Luzon. Large numbers of cadres of the underground became exposed as they surfaced and facilitated the surrender of arms and the registration of Hukbalahap fighters.

After a short period of only two months, the amnesty agreement was broken as the Philippine military started to kill leaders of the revolutionary movement. Among those killed was the principal leader of the peasant movement, Juan Feleo who was under constant escort and surveillance by the Philippine constabulary. The demonstrated bad faith of the Quirino regime and its US master was a powerful motive for the declaration of “all-out armed struggle” by the CP-SP merger party in 1950.

Localized “Peace” Approaches

Even after the failure of the Quirino-Taruc amnesty and truce agreement, Filipino assets of the US Central Intelligence Agency like Manuel Manahan and Colonel Osmundo Mondoñedo (who belonged to the outfit of Colonel Edward Lansdale) systematically approached local revolutionary leaders and local commanders of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (new name for Hukbalahap adopted in 1950) to offer localized peace and personal concessions to their family members, including jobs and scholarships for their children.

Because the role of Taruc in negotiating with the Quirino regime was never correctly and properly explained to them, field commanders of the HMB and local leaders of the revolutionary movement were susceptible to approaches by enemy agents masquerading as men of peace and goodwill. A number of them made separate deals from a narrow localist or even personal viewpoint.

The main reason for the defeat of the armed revolutionary movement in the early fifties was the Left opportunist or adventurist line of quick military victory in two years time, exaggerating the spontaneous character of the masses due to the social crisis and not paying attention to the balance of forces and the need for painstaking mass work to lay the ground for social revolution and to counteract the military superiority of the enemy forces. But the deceptive “peace” approaches to local leaders of the revolutionary movement by US and reactionary agents augmented and complemented the heavy military onslaughts of the blatant enemy in the entire strategy to defeat the revolutionary forces.

After the crushing defeat of the armed revolutionary movement, no basis whatsoever was left for any kind of peace negotiations for a long time. In 1957, the Garcia regime enacted the Anti-Subversion Law (drafted during the earlier Magsaysay regime by the American Jesuit priest Father Weiss and the US embassy political officers), which gave the ultimatum to leaders of the Communist Party and related organizations to surrender and seek amnesty within six months or else face the death penalty.

Peace through Revolutionary Struggle

With regard to the Communist Party of the Philippines, reestablished in 1968, the Marcos regime never saw the need to go through the motion of seeking peace negotiations with it. Instead, the regime always tried to destroy it outright. What the regime found more appropriate was to secure the formal surrender of the Lava revisionist group in 1974 and to give it paltry concessions in the vain hope of using it for intelligence and propaganda purposes against the Communist Party of the Philippines, New People’s Army and the National Democratic Front.

The Lava revisionist group surrendered its firearms and registered its personnel with the GRP. In exchange, the GRP granted legality to the group, recruited some members into the Constabulary Security Unit and conceded to other members homestead rights on the slope of the Sierra Madre in eastern Bulacan. The Lava group murdered at least 25 members who resisted its line of capitulation.

Since the beginning, the Communist Party of the Philippines has always regarded its program for a people’s democratic revolution as the strategic line and political basis for a just and lasting peace. Despite the all-out determination of the Marcos regime to destroy the armed revolutionary movement, which Marcos had pointed to as the principal reason for declaring martial law in 1972, the CPP in its sixth anniversary statement in 1974 declared that there could be a truce if the regime was willing to come to a mutually satisfactory agreement sufficiently beneficial to the people in terms of national independence and democracy. At the same time, so as not to confuse its own ranks, the CPP described the possibility as a remote one

As it has proceeded from the very beginning, the armed revolutionary movement has always championed and promoted a just peace, especially wherever it and the people can exercise revolutionary power and can therefore undertake campaigns of social benefit. The armed propaganda teams and other units of the people’s army have always espoused and helped build a social life that is productive and just and that is peaceful, quiet and tranquil against the depredations of the ruling system and the bad elements in local communities

The armed revolutionary movement led by the Communist Party of the Philippines builds people’s democratic power in the rural areas even as reactionary state power is still entrenched in the cities. Such a democratic power defends the people, enables them to make the all-round progress that is possible and fights for a just peace. Such a power rejects the very idea that a just peace consists of laying down the arms of the people and seeking accommodation in the violent ruling system of oppression and exploitation

The local units and leaders of the revolutionary movement have had a long experience in effecting peace and working relationships with allies since the beginning of the revolutionary movement. These have not involved the movement giving up people and territory to GRP authority under any guise.s There is certainly a qualitative difference between the peace instituted in localities by the people’s organs of democratic power and the “community-based peace” which the GRP and the Rightwing advocates of pacification are pushing in order to remove the revolutionary forces from localities and put the people under the sway of their oppressors and exploiters.

The Tripoli Agreement

The most conspicuous peace negotiations carried out by the Marcos regime were with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Tripoli, Libya in 1976. The Manila-based regime was compelled to negotiate with the MNLF and to negotiate abroad because the latter was waging an armed struggle of such a magnitude as to tie down in Moro land one third of the total combat strength of the Armed Forces of the Philippines at that time. The Libyan government acted as the third party.

There was a give-and-take in the Tripoli Agreement. In the first provision of this agreement, the MNLF submitted to the principle that the Moro question was within the framework of Philippine national sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, the MNLF gained recognition for its status of belligerency, especially among the Islamic states.

The biggest practical gain made by the Marcos regime was in inducing the highest MNLF officials, local MNLF commanders and units to expose themselves in displays of strength before the eyes of the AFP during prolonged ceasefire. Consequently, the political agents of Marcos were able to offer material concessions to specific MNLF officials and commanders and their families and persuade them to leave the MNLF. Since the Tripoli Agreement, the MNLF has been weakened by breakaways and desertions.

Peace Overtures of Marcos

The first significant instance that the Marcos regime brought up the subject of peace negotiations with the Philippine armed revolutionary movement was when Marcos did so with this writer when he was presented as a captive on November 10, 1977. He told this writer that armed struggle was passé and that national unity and reconciliation could be negotiated and agreed upon between the regime and the revolutionary movement.

Conscious of the bad example of Aguinaldo in issuing a capitulationist statement to the revolutionary forces and the people after his capture by the US army at the beginning of the century, this writer replied to Marcos that he was no longer in a position to represent the revolutionary movement upon his capture and that the automatic loss of position upon capture by the enemy is a protection of the movement against the bad example of Aguinaldo.

But this writer also told Marcos that the latter could always get in touch with him about anything beneficial to the people like he did with his captive Senator Benigno Aquino; and reminded him of historical examples of the highest authorities talking with political prisoners, like Quezon with Crisanto Evangelista in 1935 and 1936; Sukarno with D.N. Aidit in 1951; and Khan with Bhutto in the early seventies. This writer also reminded him of the French consulting with Ben Bella and the British with Jomo Kenyatta in prison. However, it was made absolutely clear that the active leaders of the revolutionary movement made the decisions on the question of war and peace.

Notwithstanding the physical torture this writer was put through from November 13 to 18, 1977 and his being shackled to a cot in solitary confinement, a series of Marcos emissaries from the military came to his isolation cell from late November 1977 onwards, to discuss the possibility of peace negotiations and, of course, to try also to fish for information. The very first of them was a ranking security consultant of Marcos, a supposedly retired military officer, who had been most instrumental in the surrender agreement between the Marcos regime and the Lava group. He never returned but the second emissary, also a senior military officer, was the one most persistent.

The premises of the emissaries were constant: there could be a peace agreement, in fact an agreement of surrender, if the revolutionary armed movement renounced violence and surrendered its arms. The premises of this writer were also constant: the movement might be willing to consider agreeing to a truce if there were basic anti-imperialist and democratic reforms.

When Marcos announced the elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa in February 1978, the second emissary came to the cell of this writer to offer his removal from solitary confinement and from his chains in exchange for a public statement endorsing the elections and expressing an intention to run as candidate for a seat in the sham parliament. The example of Benigno Aquino and other political detainees were cited. But this writer refused.

Conference of Detainees

The emissary made the rounds of the principal political prisoners, including Bernabe Buscayno, Jose Luneta, Satur Ocampo and this writer in 1978. Came November 1978, they were allowed to confer. All of them understood that they were in no position to negotiate with the regime, that they were only being consulted by the enemy and that, if Ocampo and Luneta had been given temporary release, they would be able to communicate to the movement what the regime wished to communicate.

Valuable knowledge and experience were gained by talking to the emissaries of Marcos from 1977 onwards. The strategy and tactics of those in power in talking about peace were clear and sharpened the sense of those political detainees approached of what could be the strategy and tactics of the movement. There is a lot of difference between the reading of the history of the Philippines and other countries on the one hand and actually conversing with reactionaries who talk “peace” on the other hand.

In all discussions with the “peace” emissary of Marcos, the aforementioned political detainees held the moral high ground in expressing their opinions which can be distilled in the following manner:

The free and active leaders of the revolutionary movement make the decisions. There can be no giving up of revolutionary principles although there can be a mutual adjustment of policies to achieve a truce and not the capitulation of any side. The constant principled point is to satisfy the people’s demands for national liberation and democracy. Following the precedent of talks between the Philippine government and the MNLF in Tripoli, Libya, the venue of peace negotiations should be abroad. Besides bilateral peace talks between the GRP and NDF, a council for national reconciliation and unity may be considered.

Somehow, one of the political detainees was able to have a comprehensive exchange of information and ideas with the active leadership of the revolutionary movement about the approaches of the regime. For the first time in the history of the reestablished CPP, there was a serious effort to consider and clarify under what terms the movement could negotiate with its enemy. The movement ultimately decided that conditions were not yet ripe to engage in any kind of negotiations.

Calls for Peace

In the eighties, before the assassination of Benigno Aquino, former president Diosdado Macapagal, Lorenzo M. Tañada, Jose W. Diokno and this writer issued public statements proposing at various instances a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict, but always with the big IF, if the people’s national and democratic interests were to be served. The statements were in accordance with the national and democratic interests of the people and were correctly done more to expose the antinational and antidemocratic character of the regime than anything else in view of the regime’s own objective of seeking the capitulation of the opposition forces.

After the assassination of Benigno Aquino and the rise of popular outrage against the fascist regime, no one of national significance could seriously entertain the idea of reconciliation and unity with the forces of Marcos. By then, Marcos was completely hemmed in by the popular outrage, the US pressures and other factors which converged on him.

The kind of peace proposals then being made by various leaders opposed to the Marcos regime was meant to broaden and strengthen the united front against the fascist regime and was supposed to be realized after the fall of Marcos.

It was in this spirit that Aquino supporters made contacts and cooperated with the progressive underground and aboveground organizations and the widow Corazon Aquino visited political prisoners in Bicutan to make a dramatic expression of support for them. She advocated their release and ceasefire with the armed revolutionary movement upon the end of the fascist regime.

Through public statements, the revolutionary movement and this writer, in his personal capacity, encouraged the idea of a broad united front of democratic forces to overthrow the fascist regime, satisfy the people’s demands for national freedom and democracy and thereby to work for a just and lasting peace. In her campaign speeches in 1986, Aquino pledged to release all political prisoners and to negotiate a ceasefire with the revolutionary movement.

GRP-NDF Peace Talks during the Aquino Regime

Soon after assuming power on February 25, 1986, GRP President Aquino fulfilled her pledge to release the political prisoners of the fallen Marcos regime. This was considered as both an act of her gratitude to the national democratic movement and a signal for negotiating a ceasefire. At the same time, Aquino retained Juan Ponce Enrile as her defense minister and General Fidel Ramos as AFP chief of staff.

In March 1986, NDF spokesman Antonio Zumel announced in a press conference the willingness of the NDF to dialogue with the Aquino regime on a possible ceasefire between the AFP and NPA.

This writer delivered a speech on the “Conditions for a Ceasefire” on March 29, 1986 before the Santa Mesa Heights Rotary Club. He demanded (1) further unilateral acts of goodwill on the part of the new regime; and (2) further substantial changes mutually agreed upon by the GRP and the revolutionary movement, in order to pave the way for a ceasefire.

In her speech at the graduation exercises of the University of the Philippines in April 1986, President Aquino expressed her desire for a negotiated ceasefire. The NDF and NPA issued statements, responding affirmatively

The formation of the National Reconciliation Commission was announced in a newspaper report. Chairmanship of the commission was reportedly offered to but refused by Lorenzo M. Tañada. It was also trial-ballooned in the press that the job was going to be offered to this writer. But he was never formally approached and he never had the chance to refuse it on the ground of propriety

At any rate, the Jesuits, especially Fr. Bienvenido Niebres, and Defense undersecretary General Rafael Ileto tried to push the formation of the National Reconciliation Commission and undertook a series of consultations with Bernabe Buscayno, former commander-in-chief of the New People’s Army, from April to June 1986.

But it would be the feelers of the Aquino regime through Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo and the late Jose W. Diokno, chairman of the Philippine human rights committee, that would be seriously entertained by the revolutionary movement. Fidel Agcaoili, the secretary general of SELDA (the association of former political detainees of the Marcos regime), played a key role in the preliminary communications between the presidential palace and the underground.

The NDF as Peace Negotiator

Among the GRP officials, General Ramos kept on insisting that the Communist Party of the Philippines should be the one to face the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in negotiations. But the decision in the revolutionary movement was that it should be the National Democratic Front. It was made clear that all memberorganizations of the NDF, including the CPP and NPA, could sign the authorization for the NDF to negotiate and make agreements.

In early June 1986, at the Singapore seminar on Philippine trends sponsored by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, this writer essayed to make a comprehensive estimate of the CPP’s view on a possible peace process and related matters. As in previous speeches and press interviews in Manila, he made clear that there could be a just and lasting peace only if the basic demands of the people for national liberation and democracy were to be substantially met; and that if the GRP really desired a ceasefire all that it had to do was to end the strategic offensive of the AFP, pull back the troops to the barracks, disband the paramilitary forces and put the police under the local executive officials who were appointees of the new regime.

Also in June, the GRP and NDF announced that they had engaged in discreet preliminary talks and were ready to form their negotiating panels. The GRP stated that no representative of the military would sit in its panel, although this panel would consult with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The NDF Peace Framework

In July 1986, the leaders of the revolutionary movement were able to fully discuss and formulate its framework for peace negotiations; and to appoint the members of the negotiating panel and related personnel. The framework included the principles guiding the NDF negotiating panel; the agenda consisting of exchange of views on the experience of the Filipino people since 1972, the issues of democracy and national sovereignty, the question of temporary ceasefire, and the terms and methods for realizing the truce; safety and immunity guarantees; the time scale of negotiations; the alternate venues; the procedures and technical requirements of the talks; and other related matters.

Some of the basic decisions were the following:

1. The fundamental principles and strategic line of the NDF in peace negotiations are all in the program of the national democratic revolution. The roots of the armed conflict are to be addressed and the satisfaction of the basic demands of the 37 people for national liberation and democracy is to be sought up to a certain level that allows an adjustment of policy and a truce.
   1. The substantive issues to be put in the agenda came under the headings of antifascism (civil liberties and human rights), antifeudalism (land reform) and anti-imperialism (national independence in questions of economic policy, foreign military bases, etc.).
   2. Coming ahead of these issues in the agenda was to be the discussion and agreement on the experience of the Filipino people since 1972 so that a common ground of facts could be established, the objectives of negotiations could be made clear, the demands on each side of the negotiations could be put within reasonable context and no mechanical quid pro quos could be demanded at the expense of the revolutionary movement, especially with regard to the question of armed forces.
2. Regarding nationwide ceasefire, it could be agreed to at anytime only if the Aquino regime at the minimum would call the troops back to the barracks, dismantle the paramilitary forces and put the police under the local executive officials or at the maximum would also make an executive declaration ordering the dismantling of the US military bases on or before their expiry date in 1991, in accordance with her own signature on the Declaration of Unity on December 26, 1984. When someone suggested that localized peace talks and ceasefires could relieve guerrilla fronts under attack, it was made clear that such localized peace talks and ceasefires could not be allowed because these were calculated to confuse and fragment the revolutionary movement. It was stressed that guerrilla fronts under heavy onslaughts by the AFP were to be relieved by NPA offensives in other areas and not by seeking localized ceasefires.
3. The alternate venues were supposed to be mainly in the countryside and secondarily in Metro Manila although in the latter place there would be a strong information office. Safety and immunity guarantees for the negotiators and related personnel were clarified and were supposed to be on a mutual and reciprocal basis. It was also made clear that the share of publicity to be expected from the bourgeois mass media was not worth the exposure of cadres to the AFP and would be overwhelmed anyway by the amount of publicity to be given to the GRP.

Modifications During Negotiations

The foregoing NDF framework for peace negotiations underwent modifications by the leadership of the revolutionary movement during the actual course of negotiations because the other side, the GRP, had its own framework. The GRP panel was obsessed with ceasefire. Ceasefire first, then matters like affirmation of the GRP constitution, general amnesty, legalization of the CPP and other underground forces, rehabilitation of rebel returnees and surrender of NPA personnel and arms could be discussed. These were the items in the agenda which the GRP insisted upon.

In deference to the head of the GRP negotiating panel, former Senator Jose W. Diokno, who was not in good health, the ceasefire talks between the GRP and NDF panels proceeded from August onwards in Metro Manila at the great risk of surveillance and sabotage by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and at the probable expense of the NDF panel, the underground and aboveground allies on whom the panel was relying.

It is worthwhile to compare the technical conduct of the pre-ceasefire talks and the talks during the ceasefire in 1986 and 1987 with that of negotiations towards the Pact of Biak-na-bato of 1897 and those towards the Quirino-Taruc Agreement of 1948. In the latter two cases, negotiations were held in the countryside and the security of the negotiators were in the hands of the revolutionary forces.

The talks became narrowly known as ceasefire talks in the bourgeois mass media. Moreover, the reactionaries pushed the line that ceasefire meant the surrender of arms and that sincerity of the NDF was to be measured along this line. In the days towards the visit of Aquino to the US, the GRP panel pressed hard that an unconditional 30-day ceasefire be declared as a kind of send-off gift for her to impress the US authorities in Washington. The NDF did not give in to this demand.

In her speech before the US Congress in September 1986, Aquino declared that she was engaged in ceasefire talks so as to gain the moral high ground for subsequently unsheathing the sword of war. While Aquino cultivated the image of being the champion of human rights and peace, her big comprador-landlord regime sought to consolidate its power and the reactionary armed forces launched large offensives against the NPA in five regions of the country and quietly organized and trained the vigilante groups.

In September 1986, CPP leader Rodolfo Salas, his wife and his driver were arrested. The NDF accused the GRP of bad faith in arresting Salas, who was described as an NDF consultant in the peace process. The NDF suspended the pre-ceasefire talks. After three weeks, however, these talks were resumed.

In an effort to push the talks forward, the NDF presented on November 1, 1986 the proposal for one hundred days of peace. The suggestion for a prolonged ceasefire was accompanied by another for “the formation of counterpart negotiating panels of the NDF and GRP on the regional and/or provincial levels.” These two suggestions in the same proposal had the potential of undermining and fragmenting the revolutionary movement. But, fortunately, these were not realized.

In quick response to the kidnapping and brutal murder of Rolando Olalia, chairman of Partido ng Bayan (PnB) and the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and vice chairman of Bayan on November 13, 1986, the NDF announced the suspension of its negotiations with the GRP. Members of the NDF panel attended the huge Olalia funeral march of one million people.

On November 22, the coup plot “Oplan God Save the Queen” was reported to have been completely defeated by the Aquino regime. Defense minister Enrile was replaced by the deputy defense minister General Rafael Ileto.

The GRP and NDF panels announced that they would sign the two memoranda of agreement concerning the ceasefire and the safety and immunity guarantees on the birth anniversary of Benigno Aquino, November 27.

The explanation for the NDF’s quick resumption of the talks was that the anti-Aquino Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) had been the one responsible for the Olalia murder and Oplan “God Save the Queen” and that Aquino had resolved to remove defense minister Enrile from his office upon the demand of the progressive forces.

The Two-Month Ceasefire

The Memorandum of Agreement for a Preliminary Ceasefire (MAPC) and the Memorandum of Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (MASIG) were signed on schedule, to be effective for 60 days, from December 10, 1986 to February 8, 1987. Ceasefire had been agreed upon before a substantive agenda could be agreed upon. The understanding was that the ceasefire would provide the atmosphere for setting the agenda for peace negotiations and negotiating the substantive issues.

The MAPC co-signed by the GRP and NDF stated: “This agreement, the preliminary ceasefire agreement, and any other subsequent agreement, or any provision or provisions thereof shall not invest the NDF with the status of belligerency under the laws of war.”

The NDF status of belligerency is not something invested by any document but acquired through revolutionary armed struggle and the building of democratic political power. On the other hand, the pre-ceasefire negotiations, the co-signing of the documents and the ceasefire implied recognition by GRP of the NDF’s status of belligerency.

In negotiating sessions during the ceasefire period, the GRP panel insisted that the NDF submit to the GRP Constitution as the legal and political frame for negotiations and then such matters as general amnesty, rehabilitation, legalization of underground organizations and the surrender of arms, could be subsequently discussed. The NDF correctly and succesfully resisted the GRP line of asking the NDF to capitulate.

By insisting that the NDF must first submit itself to the GRP Constitution as the legal and political frame of negotiations, the GRP panel was in principle and in effect killing the peace process and thus fended off the demand of the NDF panel that substantive issues such as those in the NDF list be put into the agenda. For the NDF to submit to the GRP Constitution would be to render the peace talks unnecessary, because then the NDF would accept GRP authority, its institutions and processes as the way to deal with the basic demands of the people.

On December 23, 1986, the NDF through its chairman Andres Macias issued the “Agenda for a Just and Enduring Peace” which declared the four guideposts for settling the armed conflict: (1) the complete dismantling of the vestiges of the Marcos fascist dictatorship and full protection of basic democratic and human rights; (2) the full promotion of the people’s welfare and livelihood; (3) the assertion of national dignity and sovereignty; and (4) the adoption of concrete guarantees for durable peace.

Within December 1986, the revolutionary movement decided to let the NDF negotiating panel make the most out of the ceasefire by pressing for the discussion of substantive issues. And in view of the refusal of the GRP to take up the substantive issues and in consideration of certain valid criticisms, the revolutionary movement decided not to extend or renew the ceasefire agreement.

What had been expected as negotiations to set and cover a comprehensive range of substantive issues was further frustrated by the GRP when its panel declared that it could no longer assure its own safety and the NDF panel’s in the face of death threats from certain military groups.

Sabotage of Ceasefire Agreement

In fact, in a clear act of perfidy and sabotage of the negotiations, General Ramos issued “Guidelines,” ordering the AFP units to disarm, arrest, detain and charge in court all armed NPA members they could surveil and encounter. This was in direct contravention of the safety and immunity guarantees and specifically the agreement of the GRP and NDF panels that violations of the ceasefire agreement by any member or unit of both the AFP and NPA would be subject to the discipline of the army concerned. The NDF panel filed a formal protest to President Aquino but she took no action.

On January 22, 1987, peasants and their urban supporters who were demonstrating in front of the presidential palace were brutally fired upon by presidential guards and additional military and police units, massacring at least 13 demonstrators and seriously injuring hundreds. That was the last straw. The NDF panel and all their personnel decided to return to the underground, although the ceasefire was still to last up to February 8, 1987.

A week after the massacre, hundreds of thousands of the people marched to the presidential palace to protest, notwithstanding the pleas of presidential subalterns against the holding of the march.

During the ceasefire period, the NDF panel engaged in consultations with the people and organizations from various walks of life and generated mass actions all over the country. Some underground cadres and NPA units appeared in public places for press coverage and visited their relatives and friends in a relaxed manner.

Post-Ceasefire Evaluation

In breaking off from the peace negotiations and declaring the end of the ceasefire according to schedule, the NDF issued on February 7, 1987 a statement, “We Cannot Betray the People’s Trust,” reaffirming its revolutionary principles and its determination to seek a just and lasting peace on the basis of addressing the roots of the armed conflict and arriving at the solutions to the basic problems of the Filipino people. The NDF also reiterated its policy commitment to engage in a new round of peace talks upon this basis at anytime.

Despite the untenability of the ceasefire, agents of the GRP and the pro-Aquino Jesuits tried to coax the NDF to extend or renew the ceasefire agreement. They failed.

The GRP actually sought not only to consolidate the position of the new ruling clique and make it look good as a champion of peace and human rights but also to do harm to the revolutionary movement by trying to deceive, split, discredit and induce it to surface for surveillance and punitive action. The GRP failed to split the revolutionary movement.

After the GRP-NDF negotiations broke down, Generals Ileto and Ramos were boasting to the press that the AFP intelligence services had increased their surveillance stocks by 25 percent during the ceasefire. The ceasefire brought to a high point the laxity of some revolutionary personnel which had been inspired by the euphoria over the downfall of the Marcos regime. The precision enemy raids and arrests from 1987 onwards and earlier with the arrest of Rodolfo Salas and his driver (who had also driven for Satur Ocampo during the pre-ceasefire talks) were definitely the result of effective surveillance.

In the aftermath of the ceasefire, a press monitoring group sponsored by the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines made a quantitative analysis of how much space in seven major Manila newspapers were allocated to the major players in the ceasefire drama. The GRP (including the GRP panel, civil and military officials) got the overwhelming amount of space. The much lesser amount of space given to the NDF was not always necessarily favorable to the NDF cause.

The Sword of War

On February 28, Aquino unleashed a Marcos-type propaganda campaign, calling on the Red fighters of the NPA to surrender their firearms in exchange for amnesty, financial reward and jobs.

In March, the NDF offered a new round of talks, provided the roots of the armed conflict were addressed. But the GRP falsely claimed that it was holding negotiations with regional and local NPA commanders.

At the graduation exercises of the Philippine Military Academy on March 22, Aquino unsheathed the “sword of war” and declared her total war policy. The GRP and AFP touted the “peace and order councils” and the vigilante groups. The massacres increased in different parts of the country, especially in the countryside. And the US authorities in Manila and Washington boasted of increased military aid to the GRP.

Aquino formed the National Peace Commission under Administrative Order No. 2 to pursue the aim of effecting the pacification and capitulation of the armed revolutionary movement.

In 1987, the NDF declared its adherence to Protocol II of the Geneva Convention and challenged the GRP to comply with the terms of this protocol which it had signed.

Notwithstanding the bellicosity of the GRP, the NDF still offered the reopening of talks to the Aquino regime on October 13. In the humanitarian spirit of the season, the NDF unilaterally declared a ceasefire on December 24-26 and December 31-January 1, 1987. The GRP grudgingly followed suit.

In the entirety of 1988, there was no significant move of any kind from either the GRP or NDF towards peace negotiations. Instead, there was an intensification of the armed conflict and the exchange of fierce words.

Aquino incited the AFP to carry out her total war policy and to crush the NPA before the end of her term. The NDF exposed her as unwilling to engage in peace talks because of US dictation, particularly from the Pentagon and State Department. The NPA delivered telling blows on the AFP in 1988 as in the previous year.

In an editorial of Liberation, the NDF official publication, a proposal was made that the NDF joined up with all other willing political forces to create the conditions for a just and lasting peace and to compel the Aquino regime to negotiate.

Third Party Initiatives

In December 1988, the Coalition for Peace organized a forum on peace to which the NDF was invited. The NDF refused to attend not only because CfP could not assure the NDF representatives of their safety in Manila but essentially because the forum was strongly slanted against the NDF’s concept of a just and lasting peace. However, the NDF expressed interest in a proposal made by International Alert for an agreement between the GRP and NDF on a code of conduct for the combatants.

The CfP has been trying to present itself as a domestic third party wishing to revive the peace process in the Philippines between the GRP and NDF. Its favorite interest, however, is to promote its concept of and campaign for local dialogues and zones of peace/zones of life even without and prior to the GRP-NDF negotiations at the appropriate national level. As a matter of fact, all experiments of the CfP on zones of peace/life have proven to be devices to support the GRP authority and displace the NDF and the NPA from local areas.

The concept of zones of peace/life is similar to the concept of peace and order councils promoted by General Ramos under Oplan Mamamayan during the time of Marcos and subsequently under Aquino. It seeks to mobilize the local respectables (especially reactionary politicians, businessmen, landlords and conservative clergy) and create public opinion against the armed revolutionary movement and “restore trust and confidence” in the GRP, including its perpetuation of the violence of oppression and exploitation.

In 1989 the concept of a forum for representatives of the GRP, NDF and MNLF to air their respective views on the terms and methods of resolving the armed conflict was initiated within the National Council of Churches of the Philippines (NCCP). This was supposed to be held abroad and sponsored by international Christian organizations, especially the World Council of Churches, the Christian Conference of Asia and the Catholic Institute of International Relations on an ecumenical basis.

The concept was further developed from one of a oneshot international forum regarding the peace process to one of a long-term program to promote and assist the peace process, especially in the international arena. This concept has gained the support of several international organizations, including the World Council of Churches, which has provided valuable assistance to peace processes in different parts of the world.

Renewed Peace Efforts

In February 1989, through its chief international representative Luis Jalandoni, the NDF expressed willingness to start a new round of peace talks if the Aquino regime made an executive proclamation against the renewal of the bases agreement with the US on or before September 16, 1991. In response, Aquino set the surrender of arms by the NPA as precondition to peace talks.

In April, the NDF through spokesman Satur Ocampo announced that the NDF would declare a unilateral ceasefire and enter into negotiations with the GRP if President Aquino issued an executive declaration to dismantle the US military bases and prevent their extension. Ocampo reiterated the same point in July 1989. But the arrogant reply of Aquino was that she did not take cues from the NDF. Shortly afterwards, former NDF negotiators Ocampo and Carolina Malay were arrested in Manila while they were pursuing a new initiative for a peace process.

In August 1989, an emissary of a group interested in peace negotiations and counting the membership of a close associate of President Aquino came to the Netherlands to explore the possibility of a new round of peace talks between the GRP and NDF. He consulted with this writer and talked appropriately with Luis Jalandoni, chief international representative of the NDF. The latter readily agreed to talks about peace talks abroad. But the GRP backed out of these as a result of the serious coup attempt in December 1989.

In January 1990, President Aquino launched the “Decade for Peace” (1990-2000) in a meeting at the presidential palace, with representatives from church and other conservative organizations attending. The idea of pacification was promoted.

On February 27, the NDF wrote Senator Wigberto Tañada a letter reiterating its offer of a unilateral ceasefire in exchange for Aquino’s commitment to dismantle the US military bases. Tañada requested Aquino to initiate a “national forum for peace.” She turned down the offer.

Within the first quarter of the year, representatives of certain organizations initiated efforts to conceptualize a framework for a peace process and to realize such formations as the People’s Caucus and the Multisectoral Peace Advocates.

Separately, the National Peace Conference (NPC) under the auspices of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) and the Peace Desk of the protestant National Council of Churches of the Philippines (NCCP) also started efforts to promote the peace process in the Philippines. Such efforts have been welcomed by the NDF, provided these are even-handed and are not slanted towards the GRP. Representatives of peace advocates from the religious sector have exchanged views with NDF representatives.

In collaboration with foreign organizations, especially International Alert, the CfP attempted to organize a forum in Hongkong in July 1990. But this forum was aborted because, contrary to a previous agreement, the GRP refused to have the interface with the NDF. The NDF was also critical of the fact that participants so-called in the forum were being chosen solely and lopsidedly by CfP in favor of the GRP. And they were supposed to evaluate the GRP and NDF positions.

But in the Philippines, a dialogue was held in lieu of the forum and was participated in by GRP and NDF representatives on July 20. Because this meeting was held shortly after a strong earthquake causing devastation over large areas in Northern Luzon, NDF representatives committed the NDF to a unilateral ceasefire in earthquakedevastated areas on humanitarian grounds. Within 24 hours, the General Command of the NPA announced that the NPA would take a defensive posture and abstain from launching offensives in the aforesaid areas, would participate in relief work and would not interfere with the relief work of others.

The GRP did not express willingness to dialogue with the NDF and did not reciprocate the unilateral ceasefire of the NDF until after some weeks, and only after the Philippine Senate, former President Macapagal, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, church leaders and several respected organizations urged Aquino to declare a ceasefire and engage the NDF and other political forces in a dialogue. In September, the NPA ended its ceasefire and held the GRP responsible for duplicity by pursuing offensive operations against the NPA and the people in guerrilla fronts in the quake-devastated areas.

Multisectoral Peace Advocates

From this meeting would emerge the Multisectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA). Although progressive elements like Senator Wigberto Tañada and Dr. Maria Serena Diokno are prominently here, there are representatives of conservative organizations with a pro-GRP orientation, like the Coalition for Peace, that have a strong presence here.

The MSPA has put forward a framework for a peace process and has been conversing with Cluster E of the Aquino Cabinet (the cluster in charge of national security matters) for the purpose of promoting the settlement of armed conflicts and bilateral peace talks between the GRP and NDF.

The NDF has welcomed the domestic third party initiative of MSPA and has expressed appreciation for its views: (1) that the roots of the armed conflict must be addressed and (2) that the GRP-NDF bilateral peace talks may be held abroad, if necessary. At the same time, the NDF objects to certain points in the MSPA framework.

1. Conscious of its national revolutionary status, the NDF refuses to be regarded as being at par with RAM, SFP and YOU (mutinous forces within the AFP) or even with the MNLF (scope limited to Moro people and land). The NDF is a nationwide alliance of patriotic and progressive forces, carrying out a national democratic revolution, with organs of political power and a well-disciplined people’s army and in control of considerable portions of the Philippine population and territory. It is engaged in a civil war with the GRP and not in a mere insurgency. It is a belligerent force and not a mere insurgent force.
2. True to its revolutionary principles, the NDF does not accept the GRP Constitution as the sole and onesided legal and political frame of negotiations and refuses to be drawn at the outset to the line of “restoring trust and confidence in GRP.” Neither does the NDF demand that the GRP submit itself to the NDF Constitution and Program. Instead, the NDF proposes such mutually acceptable principles as national sovereignty, democracy, social justice and the like and the agreements still to be made as the legal and political frame of negotiations.
3. The NDF is opposed to the scheme of any particular organization or institution, posing as third force morally superior to the contending parties in the civil war and claiming the people for itself, to focus on areas where the NDF and its member-organizations (especially the New People’s Army) as well as people’s organs of political power exist; seek to push out or paralyze these popular entities; picture the NPA as a force unwanted by the people as the AFP; but in fact to uphold the political authority of the GRP. Proposals for “localized peace dialogues,” “localized ceasefires,” “community-based peace” and “zones of peace, zones of life” are calculated to undermine and fragment the revolutionary movement and run counter to the proposal for GRP-NDF bilateral peace talks at the national level.
4. The NDF does not agree to the surrender of arms as the bias or predetermined objective of the peace process. The substantive issues, addressing the roots of the armed conflict, must first be tackled. In the meantime, with regard to the question of ending the armed conflict, it may simply be put in the agenda by referring to armed forces and redisposition thereof. To effect the end of hostilities, there are several possibilities, including a lasting truce.
5. With regard to the question of ceasefire, it cannot be taken up until after discussion and agreement on the substantive issues, unless such ceasefire be on a humanitarian ground for a limited period of time or in connection with the dismantling of the US military bases. Ceasefire on humanitarian grounds is best clarified in a full agreement on human rights.

On its own ground and understanding of a just and lasting peace and upon the stimulus of a broad array of peace advocates in the Philippines and abroad, the CPP as the leading party in the revolutionary movement and the NDF as the united front organization have further developed their own framework for a peace process.

This framework has been developed in line with the national democratic program, taking into account new conditions and lessons learned from the 1986-87 preceasefire talks and ceasefire period.

In response to an invitation from the NDF, a close associate of President Aquino met with NDF vice chairman for international affairs Luis Jalandoni in Singapore on September 23-24, 1990. There was no substantial result from this meeting, except a show of goodwill between the two sides.

First Meeting with Yap

The first serious emissary of the GRP to seek an audience with the NDF and show readiness to talk concretely about the peace process was Rep. Jose Yap, chairman of the national defense committee of the Philippine house of representatives and close political associate of President Aquino. He came to Amsterdam, Netherlands on September 26, 1990, consulted with this writer and sought his help as a consultant for the peace process. Subsequently, Yap met with Luis Jalandoni, NDF vice chairman for international affairs, and Byron Bocar, NDF international representative, from September 27 to 29.

Other members of the Yap mission were his advisors Horacio Morales, president of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, and Atty. Romeo Capulong, chairman of the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace. This writer had the privilege of being consulted by both the Yap mission and the NDF officials.

Rep. Yap and the NDF representatives agreed to work for certain measures to improve the atmosphere for GRP-NDF bilateral negotiations. These measures included the review of cases of political prisoners and their release in accordance with respect for the right to bail and the eventual repeal of the Marcos PD 1866 which negates the right to bail in many cases.

Most important of all, the letter of Manuel Romero, NDF chairperson dated September 20, 1990, comprehensively unfolding the NDF’s strategic view of the peace process, was given to Rep. Yap for delivery to President Aquino. In addition, upon the request of Yap, the NDF also sent to Aquino the aide memoire of NDF vice chairman Jalandoni on the lessons from the 1986-87 peace talks.

The NDF Peace Framework

The NDF framework for the peace process includes the following points:

1. A new round of peace talks can be started at anytime, without any substantive precondition that is unilaterally beneficial or costly to any side. The NDF is willing to form a negotiating panel simultaneously with the GRP at anytime.
2. Safety and immunity guarantees are agreed upon and cosigned by the two sides or are issued by one to the other side on a mutual and reciprocal basis to enable the free and unhampered movement of the members and related personnel of the negotiating panels.
3. To create a favorable atmosphere for negotiations, the NDF expects the GRP in accordance with its own Constitution and laws to do the following as a matter of course: respect the right to bail, repeal PD 1886, review cases of political detainees and release said detainees on the basis of their right to bail or by dropping charges. A number of the released detainees will participate in the negotiations, either as members or support personnel of the NDF negotiating panel and working groups. Also to create a favorable atmosphere, NDF will declare a unilateral ceasefire if the GRP in accordance with its own Constitution and the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity bans the US military bases and troops on or before September 16, 1991.
4. The legal and political frame of the peace negotiations is constituted by the mutually acceptable principles of national sovereignty, democracy and social justice and by the agreements still to be made through the negotiations. Neither should the GRP insist on its Constitution as the sole and onesided legal and political frame nor the NDF on its own Constitution and Program.
5. The substantive agenda of comprehensive peace negotiations includes the following:
   1. A preliminary mutual understanding on the objectives of the negotiations and the basic problems of the people.
   2. Mutual respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.
   3. Social and economic reforms.
   4. Political, constitutional and electoral reforms.
   5. Armed forces and redisposition thereof.
6. Notwithstanding its willingness to forge agreements on a wide range of issues, the NDF seeks as immediate minimum goal an agreement with the GRP on human rights and international humanitarian law and on the mechanisms and processes to ensure respect for these. Such an agreement should be able to stand whether the armed conflict continues or a peace settlement is ultimately made. This agreement is immediately demanded by the Filipino people and all domestic and international organizations concerned with human rights.
7. A quarter of a year can be devoted to each of the major items in the substantive agenda for negotiations and agreement, as enumerated under No. 5 above. The time frame can be 55 accelerated with the employment and assistance of working groups per item, which shall prepare in advance the working drafts of the negotiating panels.
8. The peace negotiations must be held at a mutually agreed place abroad in order to assure safety and convenience. In this connection, lessons must be learned from the pre-ceasefire talks and ceasefire period in 1986-87. The GRP has repeatedly held peace talks with the MNLF abroad. It is the common practice for parties in armed conflicts to hold peace talks abroad.
9. At best, a state or interstate entity or the UN Secretary General can provide the good offices or act as intermediary in the peace talks. Such a third party can assume the role of a witness, observer, good office or intermediary. At the least, for a start, any respectable international nongovernmental organization or appropriate UN agency may be a facilitator of the peace talks.
10. The broad array of peace advocates in the Philippines is recognized by the NDF as a moral force for a just and lasting peace, as a forum and medium of national consensus and as a resource base for assisting the peace process.

On October 3, 1990, Jalandoni, Yap and this writer as a consultant in the peace process issued parallel and similar press statements regarding their respective roles and what was accomplished in the Amsterdam talks. The three of them expressed optimism about the prospects of peace talks.

Peace Advocates: Right, Middle and Left

On October 5, 1990, the NDF National Council issued the “Message to the Advocates of a Just Peace,” affirming the NDF position on the peace process and the need to address the roots of the armed conflict and criticizing those who seek the pacification of the revolutionary movement. In a letter to Senator Tañada and other members of the MSPA dated November 5, NDF chairman Romero reiterated the position of the NDF and reaffirmed the valuable role of the peace advocates.

There is a broad array of peace advocates inside and outside of the MSPA in the legal arena. They are not a homogeneous lot. They include the Right, Middle and Left. The Right concurs with the basic premises of the GRP rather than with those of the NDF. The Left concurs with those of the NDF rather than with those of the GRP. At the same time, there is the Middle trying to be the honest broker, operating according to principles and general terms which do not offend any of the basic negotiating parties, the GRP and NDF.

So far, the Right wing “peace” advocates have been the most articulate and active in putting forward a comprehensive framework for the pacification of the revolutionary forces calling on them to submit to the GRP Constitution, to restore trust and confidence in GRP, to beg for accommodation and paltry concessions, abandon the people in one locality after another under the slogan of zones of peace/life and to surrender arms.

So far, the legal progressive forces (Left and Middle) have concentrated on the general call for addressing the roots of the armed conflict and have not yet put forward a comprehensive framework for a peace process, comparable to that of the Right. Thus, the Right has gained some initiative in swaying some elements of the Middle and even the Left.

In the Philippines, the united front for addressing the roots of the armed conflict and for a just and lasting peace was broadened through a meeting of advocates for a just peace on October 6 and a multisectoral conference called the People’s Caucus on October 13-14. This issued the declaration, “Assert the People’s Sovereign Will: Ensure and Work for the Supremacy of Genuine Democratic Coalition Rule.” This carried the signatures of GRP legislators, religious, academicians and concerned individuals and church groups, coalitions and alliances, people’s organizations and other political and social groups and institutions

On October 19-21, the National Peace Conference was convened, with 200 participants from 17 sectoral groups headed by former President Diosdado Macapagal. Because of the strong presence of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, businessmen and executive officials of the GRP, this formation of “peace advocates” has a far more conservative complexion than the People’s Caucus headed by Senator Wigberto Tañada.

The NDF has rejected the importunings of the Right “peace” advocates for the pacification of the revolutionary forces and has been waiting for the legal progressive forces (Left and Middle) to unite, take initiative and put forward their own peace proposals towards a just and lasting peace. The broad array of genuine peace advocates can serve as a strong moral force to compel the GRP to negotiate, as a forum and medium of national consensus and as a resource base for assisting the peace process.

The Substantive Agenda

In further support and elaboration of NDF chairman Romero’s letter to Aquino dated September 20, 1990, Jalandoni, the NDF vice chairman for international affairs, delivered the speech, “Sovereignty and Peace: Options and Alternatives for the Philippine Revolutionary Movement” on November 17, 1990, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the trial of the Marcos regime by the Permanent People’s Tribunal. He went into detail about the substantive agenda proposed by the NDF. Hereunder is the outline of the substantive agenda of the NDF.

1. Agreement on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

1. Respect for and compliance with Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions and other international humanitarian laws.
2. End of the government’s total war policy, investigation and prosecution of human rights violations, and indemnification of the victims, including return of internal refugees to their domicile.
3. Repeal of all repressive laws and reversal of the Supreme Court ruling on warrantless arrest.
4. Safe conduct for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and all other medical personnel across battle lines and contested areas.
5. Respect for personnel and facilities of schools, medical profession, religious institutions and places of worship, voluntary evacuation centers and development projects of genuine NGOs.
6. Exchange of prisoners, preferably thru a UN agency or the ICRC.
7. Occasional local ceasefires of definite brief duration on humanitarian grounds (natural disasters and medical reasons) approved by national authorities of both the NDF and GRP (not by local authorities);
8. A mechanism and process to ensure compliance with the agreement, the exchange of complaints and monitoring.

2. Agreement on Socio-Economic Reforms

1. Guidance by the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights.
2. A genuine and thoroughgoing agrarian reform.
3. A policy of national industrialization, with strong incentives to local entrepreneurs and restrictions on foreign multinational firms.
4. Freedom from foreign debt through cancellation of fraudulent debts, moratorium on payments, debt cap, rescheduling and other measures.
5. Rechanneling of funds from debt service payments and military spending to social services and genuine development programs.
6. Urban reform plan, which stops rendering people homeless and which provides low-cost housing for the poor and assistance for means of livelihood.
7. Strict measures to stop the degradation of the environment and to protect and promote a healthy environment.

3. Agreement on Political, Constitutional and Electoral Reforms

1. Guidance by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.
2. Guarantees to basic human and democratic rights of the people, especially the workers and peasants, in accordance with mutually acceptable principles and provisions of the Constitution and other laws of the GRP and those of the NDF.
3. Abrogation of unequal agreements and treaties, especially the Military Bases Agreement, Military Assistance Agreement and the Mutual Defense Pact with the US
4. Immediate removal of US bases and a program of baselands conversion
5. Respect for the right to self-determination of the Bangsa Moro, Cordillera and other indigenous peoples.
6. Electoral reforms to take away undue advantages of political parties of the comprador and landlord classes and provide for genuine democratic pluralism, allowing a fair chance for political parties representing the workers, peasants and the middle class.
7. A mechanism like a Council of National Unity to ensure the implementation of political, constitutional and electoral reforms and the holding of free and fair elections as well as the economic and social reforms agreed upon.

4. Agreement on the Armed Forces and the Redisposition thereof

1. Removal of US control over the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
2. Reorientation, reorganization, and reduction of the AFP.
3. Demobilization of AFP units and disbanding of paramilitary forces and private armies.
4. Mutual general amnesty.
5. Status of the New People’s Army.
6. Lasting truce.

Second Meeting with Yap

In late November 1990, the Yap mission came for the second time to Amsterdam, Netherlands. Yap reported on actions undertaken by President Aquino and consultations with defense secretary Ramos and AFP chief of staff de Villa but did not carry with him any formal written reply from President Aquino to the letter of NDF chairman Romero.

Instead, he brought with him the framework for peace drafted by the Department of National Defense and Armed Forces of the Philippines for the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. This is not a framework for peace negotiations but for killing the peace process by demanding at the very outset the surrender of the NDF to the Constitution of the GRP and ultimately the liquidation of the NPA and surrender of NPA arms.

The NDF did not take offense at the lack of a formal written response from Aquino but noted in strong terms that the DND/AFP cannot deal directly with the NDF and bypass the political authority of the GRP. According to a later report from MSPA, Cluster E of the Aquino Cabinet confirmed the framework of the DND/AFP as that of the GRP.

Hereunder are verbatim extracts from the GRP framework:

Statement of General Principles:

• 1.1 The supremacy of the GRP Constitution as the fundamental law of the land and the basis for national peace and progress must be accepted by all. No one may be allowed to violate the fundamental law of the land. The Supreme Court is the sole and final arbiter on questions of constitutionality. The Constitution recognizes the right of political forces to lawfully compete for the political leadership of the country. The use of force and violence to achieve political ends must be renounced.
• 1.2 Peace is of paramount importance to the well being of the people and the country’s political, economic and social development. The current internal conflict can be resolved through a peace process. All paths towards peace must be explored. Peace must be given a chance.
• 1.3 There must only be one authorized and recognized armed forces of the country. All other organized armed groups must be deemed illegal and are to be disbanded.

Agenda for the Peace Process:

The agenda for the peace process shall be limited to relevant issues that can be resolved within the mandate of the parties concerned. Principal agenda items shall be composed of the following:

1. Suspension of hostilities in mutually agreed upon specified prioritized areas.
2. Amnesty for insurgents.
3. Laying down of arms.
4. Disbanding of the NPA.
5. Safe return of insurgents to a peaceful and productive life.
6. Government assistance to and protection of insurgent returnees.
7. Legalization of the CPP.
8. Treatment of NPA “hold outs.”

Phases of the Peace Process:

The phasing of the peace process is a vital dimension of the framework. The peace process shall proceed along the following:

1. Initiation of peace process through exploratory talks between the government and peace advocates (MSPA).
2. Establishment of formal mechanism for the peace process.
3. Formalization of Agreements.
4. Implementation of Agreements.
5. Monitoring and evaluation of substantive compliance.
6. Treatment of violations and sanctions against violators.

Obstruction by General Ramos

At any rate, certain tentative agreements were still made by the NDF representatives with Rep. Yap regarding the possible release of political prisoners and mutual ceasefire in the humanitarian spirit of Christmas and New Year; and the formation of the human rights working groups of the GRP and NDF which were to lay the groundwork for negotiations and agreement on human rights and international humanitarian law.

The tentative agreement on mutual ceasefire in the humanitarian spirit of Christmas and New Year would be carried out, with changes towards a shorter duration of three days per occasion. But the release of political prisoners and the formation of negotiating panels and working groups on human rights were not fulfilled according to the agreed time frame.

In the name of DND and AFP, General Ramos has been obstructing the peace process. President Aquino and Cluster E on national security of the Aquino cabinet have gone along with General Ramos whenever he takes an adverse initiative to sabotage the peace process. He is reported to be consulting with US authorities and following their orders.

Subsequent to the last Yap mission to Amsterdam, the GRP has limited itself to dealing with the MSPA in accordance with the DND-AFP line that the GRP must first talk with the MSPA and only after agreements have been made between the two can the NDF deal with the prior agreements made between the GRP and MSPA. In other words, a device is being used in which the bilateral peace talks between the GRP and NDF are being blocked.

Taking advantage of the nonviolence pact among the reactionary parties and the growing fever over the 1992 elections, the GRP has cut down talks even with the MSPA.

It is clear once again that the GRP uses the show of willingness to talk with the NDF only as a tactical ploy for trying to cope with the worsening crisis, to douse social unrest and to blunt the offensives of the revolutionary movement.

Nevertheless, the NDF has remained firm on its comprehensive framework, which adheres to revolutionary principles and has the flexibility of adjusting policy to allow negotiations and agreements with the GRP, for the benefit of the people along the national and democratic line.

The National Democratic Line

Like any strategic line, the national democratic line in the entire peace process and in any concrete peace negotiations contains and permits certain tactical lines which serve the strategic line. It is always possible to work out a truce agreement or even an agreement of alliance between two adversaries in order to confront a bigger adversary of the nation like US imperialism or solve certain crucial problems. As a revolutionary force, the NDF can be expected to reject any proposal for surrender but can always be expected to consider any proposal for truce and alliance if predicated on the national and democratic rights and interests of the people and on a popular struggle against common adversaries and common problems.

It is noteworthy that Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (defense minister/secretary under Marcos and Aquino) seems to have a better and more positive understanding of the NDF’s strategic line than President Aquino or General Ramos. Enrile was quoted by the press as saying that if he would be president of the GRP he would engage the NDF in a truce and coalition government for three years and would not require the NPA to surrender arms. Of course, especially because of his background, it remains to be seen whether he means what he says.

At whatever rate the GRP shows interest or loss of it in the peace process at any point, the NDF can persevere in taking a just and reasonable stand on behalf of the people in seeking to inspire a broad united front for national liberation and democracy and in working in the international arena for recognition of the NDF as the legitimate representative of the revolutionary forces and people.

Confidence of the NDF

Whichever conservative party or clique of reactionaries is in power in Manila, the NDF can be expected to be ready to negotiate a just and lasting peace in accordance with the national democratic line. A common resolve to address the roots of the armed conflict and face a common foe or confront certain problems; and a truce and realignment of forces along the national democratic line can be the initial stage in the process of attaining a just and lasting peace.

Abroad, through the efforts of the National Democratic Front, the European Parliament approved on December 13, 1990 a resolution endorsing the bilateral peace talks of the GRP and NDF. For the first time, no less than an interstate entity, the parliament of the European Community, recognized the NDF and put it on an equal footing with the GRP. There are also specific states which have been approached by the NDF and have agreed to offer their good offices to both the GRP and the NDF.

At the same time, respected international organizations and institutions are expressing support for the just and reasonable peace framework of the NDF and are extending moral and material support for its realization and for the NDF as a legitimate political force, representative of the ever growing number of people militantly engaged in carrying out a national democratic revolution and building a new kind of government.

The NDF is confident that in due time the growing strength of the revolutionary forces and people, the worsening crisis of the Philippine ruling system and the moral forces of domestic and world public opinion would compel the GRP to engage the NDF in peace negotiations.