Protracted People’s War and Diplomacy

Introduction

My assignment in this anti-imperialist conference is to discuss protracted people’s war and diplomacy. I propose to discuss first the protracted people’s war in the Philippines. Then, I shall discuss diplomacy and the relation of this to people’s war.

Protracted People’s War

The protracted people’s war in the Philippines cannot be discussed without priorly understanding the character of Philippine society and the corresponding character of the Philippine revolution.

Philippine society today is semicolonial because in form the political system is independent but in fact it continues to be dominated by imperialism behind the joint class dictatorship of the comprador big bourgeoisie and landlord class. The dominant political parties and the series of ruling cliques represent these exploiting classes and are subservient to foreign monopoly capitalism. The apparatuses of state power are dependent on and controlled by US imperialism.

Philippine society is semifeudal because its socioeconomic system is basically agrarian, without basic industries, and is run by the aforesaid exploiting classes to serve foreign monopoly capitalism. In the cities, the big compradors reign over the import-dependent enterprises in the commercial and industrial sectors in combination with the direct subsidiaries of foreign monopoly firms. In the countryside, the landlords own the vast tracts of land for the production of export crops and staple food.

In correspondence to the semicolonial and semifeudal character of Philippine society, the character of the Philippine revolution is national-democratic or in other words anti-imperialist and antifeudal. The principal tasks of this revolution are to fight for the people’s national sovereignty and achieve national liberation against imperialism and its local puppets and to realize as the main substance of democracy the social liberation of the peasant majority of the people through land reform.

Pursuing these tasks began with the old democratic revolution of 1896. But it was frustrated by the intervention of US imperialism in 1898 and by its war of aggression, starting in 1899. The current revolution in the Philippines is therefore a resumption of the old democratic revolution. But at the same time, it is a democratic revolution of the new type. The class leadership is no longer that of the bourgeoisie but that of the proletariat. The revolution is no longer within the context of the world bourgeois democratic revolution but that of the world proletarian socialist revolution.

The new-democratic revolution cannot be accomplished without overthrowing the power of imperialism and their local puppet reactionaries. Therefore, the road of armed revolution has been once more taken by the people in order to get rid of the counterrevolutionary state and free themselves from oppression and exploitation by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. Upon the nationwide seizure of political power, the proletariat and the people can proceed to socialist revolution.

As the advanced detachment of the leading class in the revolution, the Communist Party of the Philippines has adopted the general line of national democratic revolution through protracted people’s war since the reestablishment of this party on 26 December 1968. This general line is based on domestic concrete conditions and the rich historical revolutionary experience of the Filipino people and is guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the advances made in the struggle against imperialism, revisionism and reaction in the ’60s.

In people’s war, the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside and accumulating strength in the countryside over a long period of time until it is possible to seize the cities is in accordance with the revolutionary class line of the CPP. This class line seeks to bind the proletariat and peasantry in a basic alliance as the foundation of the national-democratic revolution as well as of the consequent socialist revolution upon the nationwide seizure of political power. In the concrete semifeudal conditions of the Philippines, the worker-peasant alliance is effectively developed through people’s war.

The comprehensive revolutionary class line of the CPP is to uphold the leadership of the proletariat, rely mainly on the peasantry, win over the middle social strata of urban petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie and take advantage of the splits among the reactionaries in order to isolate and destroy the power of the worst reactionary puppet clique at every given time.

In the countryside, the antifeudal class line requires the proletariat to rely mainly on the poor peasants and farm workers, win over the middle peasants, neutralize the rich peasants and take advantage of the splits among the landlords in order to isolate and destroy the power of the despotic landlords.

The people’s war is a revolutionary mass undertaking. It is a politico-military process which entails three integral components. These are the revolutionary armed struggle, agrarian revolution and the building of the mass movement.

The CPP conceives of a probable course of development in people’s war. This involves the strategic stages of defensive, stalemate and offensive. Up to this time, the New People’s Army is in the stage of the strategic defensive within which it can launch tactical offensives. It is determined to grow from small to big and from weak to strong in the countryside where the peasant majority of the people are and where the terrain affords room for maneuver.

In the long course of people’s war, it is possible for the revolutionary movement to carry out land reform in stages from the minimum program of rent reduction, elimination of usury, raising of farm wages, fair prices for farm products and the raising of production in agriculture and side occupations to the maximum program of land confiscation from the landlords and free distribution of land to the peasants.

In mass base building, the CPP arouses, organizes and mobilizes the masses. Mass organizations of workers, peasants, women, youth, cultural activists, children and others are built and carry out mass campaigns on various basic issues. The appointive provisional organs of political power and then the elective regular organs of political power are formed. The people’s democratic government attend to problems in mass organization, public education, land reform, finance, production, defense, health, culture, arbitration and so on.

Diplomacy of the People’s Democratic Government

So much for the general explanation of protracted people’s war. I wish to start discussing diplomacy in its proper sense. In the simplest dictionary definition, it means the conduct of relations between states directly through their respective heads or through representatives.

The revolutionary forces and the people led by the CPP are building a new revolutionary state even as the old reactionary state of the comprador big bourgeoisie and landlord class is still well entrenched in the cities. The new revolutionary state seeks to displace the old reactionary state in more and more areas of the countryside until it becomes possible to do so in the cities.

I have referred to the revolutionary organs of political power. These have been formed since the very beginning of the protracted people’s war. These are now in thousands of villages in the Philippines. These are the foundation of higher levels of political power at the municipal, district, provincial, regional and national levels.

At whichever level, the appropriate leading organ of the CPP can exercise sole governmental authority until the organ of political power, appointive or elective, can arise to assume administrative functions. The NDF, as the underground united front organization, helps to prepare the way for the emergence of organs of political power at levels higher than the village level. The CPP is at the core and leads all organs of political power.

Since 1972, the CPP has promulgated the Rules for Establishing the People’s Democratic Government. This amounts to the constitution of the organs of political power. But so far, there is yet no public proclamation of the provisional revolutionary government at the national level. In the latter half of the ’80s, some regional and provincial governments were proclaimed prematurely and erroneously, unduly exposing regions and provinces where the revolutionary forces and the masses were relatively strong.

The CPP is now avoiding the public proclamation of provisional governments at levels higher than the village level. It has decided that it is better to gain further strength and broaden participation than to beat the drums, blow the trumpets and attract enemy onslaughts. It has recognized that to form organs of political power prematurely at higher levels is to draw cadres away from basic revolutionary tasks at the grassroots and towards unnecessary and costly bureaucratic verticalization.

For quite some time, since the ’70s, the CPP and the NDF have related discreetly with foreign governments and offices which take an anti-imperialist stand in addition to ruling revolutionary parties and movements abroad. But even when there is a presumption that the CPP or the NDF is representing the people’s democratic government in dealing with a foreign government, there has yet been no open and explicit proclamation of the relations as diplomatic in character. So, the CPP and NDFP have preferred to call these relations protodiplomatic.

In recent years, the revolutionary forces and organs of political power led by the CPP have authorized the NDF to represent them in protodiplomatic and diplomatic relations with foreign governments. Insofar as there is yet no open and formal diplomatic recognition extended by any foreign government, it may be said that the informal and discreet relations that the NDF has with certain governments or offices thereof have a protodiplomatic character.

At the point that the US was about to launch its war of aggression in the Persian Gulf in 1990, the NDF co-signed with the representative of the Iraqi government a document against the impending war of aggression. In connection with the prospect of peace negotiations with the Manila government, the NDF has been in official contacts with several states and interstate agencies and has been the subject of official references in the communications of several states and in resolutions passed by European governments, including those of the Swiss parliament and European Parliament.

The revolutionary organs of political power and the revolutionary forces have authorized the NDF to engage the Manila government in exploratory talks about peace talks and in formal peace talks. In both types of talks, the NDF has faced up to the reactionary government in the Philippines on an equal footing within the purview of international law.

The NDF has retained its revolutionary integrity and upheld the Rules for Establishing the People’s Democratic Government. So has the Manila government stuck to its counterrevolutionary character and 1987 constitution. Both parties can engage in formal peace negotiations only because they have agreed in The Hague Joint Declaration of 1 September 1992 on a framework of mutually acceptable principles such as national sovereignty, democracy and development, and social justice and of there being no precondition whatsoever that would violate the character and purpose of peace negotiations.

The Hague Joint Declaration also sets forth by mutual agreement the substantive agenda which includes such headings as the following: (1) mutual respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, (2) social and economic reforms, (3) political and constitutional reforms, and (4) end of hostilities and disposition of forces.

As in any peace negotiations, the two contending parties agree to engage in these upon the premise that they try to address the root causes of the war. The NDF takes firmly the position that the revolutionary forces and organs of political power that it represents can engage in the peace negotiations only if such basic problems of the Filipino people as foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism are addressed. The position of the NDF is that under international law the NDF and the revolutionary movement it represents are guided by a constitution, have the inherent status of belligerency, acquired through revolutionary hard work and struggle, have a national structure of political authority and military command and exercise effective control over a significant portion of the Philippine population and territory.

Indeed, the NDF and GRP are co-belligerents in a civil war. The GRP is absolutely wrong whenever it claims anywhere that the revolutionary forces and organs of political power represented by the NDF are merely insurgent forces. How can the revolutionary forces in the Philippines be considered a mere police problem, when their just revolutionary cause is clear, they encompass millions of people and the enemy deploys its regular military forces against them and has spent hundreds of billions of pesos in more than 26 years?

It has been the consistent position of the NDF since 1990 that exploratory talks and formal peace talks with the GRP be held in a foreign neutral venue, with the cooperation and assistance of a foreign state or interstate agency. The NDF has learned well the lessons drawn from the ceasefire talks and ceasefire agreement with the GRP in 1986 and 1987. There are serious costs to the revolutionary government, if talks were to be held in Manila or in any guerrilla front in the Philippines.

In connection with the question of venue for exploratory talks from 1990 to 1995, the NDF and the GRP have mutually agreed several times to communicate in parallel to some governments as possible host. They mutually agreed to approach the Belgian government separately and in parallel to request it to host the opening of the formal peace negotiations. The Belgian government, through its foreign ministry, graciously agreed to host and facilitate the formal opening of peace negotiations last 26 June 1995.

The GRP has suspended its peace negotiations with the NDF since 27 June 1995 after failing to release NDF consultant Sotero Llamas from detention in compliance with the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees. However the GRP and the NDF have had back channel communications and are looking forward to the resumption of their negotiations subsequent to the release of Llamas. The two parties are exploring the venues for the meetings of the negotiating panels and the reciprocal working committees in Europe.

Relationship of People’s War and Diplomacy

Let me now discuss the relationship of the protracted people’s war and the diplomacy that is arising from the GRP-NDF peace negotiations. Are these not contradictory with each other? Don’t the peace negotiations undermine or run counter to the protracted people’s war.

Of course, we recognize that the two different things are contradictory. But we must know what is the principal thing and the secondary one and we must also see the identity that makes the two things related and significant.

It is clear to the NDF as a matter of principle that the protracted people’s war is the principal thing and that it goes into peace negotiations as a secondary thing in order to carry forward the unwavering line of struggle for national liberation and democracy. The peace negotiations are one more form of struggle that has arisen between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary governments in the Philippines.

The NDF has made clear to everyone that even as it wisely and properly conducts peace negotiations through its duly authorized negotiating panel these are secondary not only to the revolutionary armed struggle, which is now the principal form of struggle, but also to the legal mass movement of the patriotic and progressive forces. The overriding principle over all forms of struggle is to fight for national liberation and democracy. Otherwise, peace negotiations become a mode of capitulation.

The peace negotiations as conducted by the NDF is one more form of legal struggle which is not superior to the legal mass struggles but which is superior only in one respect, that these negotiations allow the NDF to face the GRP as an equal under international law. There are quite a number of legal forms of struggle that involve operating within the legal and political framework of GRP.

What is identical in the revolutionary forces engaging in both protracted people’s war and in peace negotiations is the aim of fighting for a just and lasting peace across the battlefield as well as across the negotiating table. So as not to confuse the people, the revolutionary forces always make clear that the line of struggle for national liberation and democracy is the same line for a just and lasting peace. So far, the protracted people’s war has given solid results along this line whereas the peace negotiations have not yet begun even only to tackle the first item in the substantive agenda.

The formal peace negotiations between the NDF and the GRP signify a high level of national and international recognition for the strength already achieved by the revolutionary forces in the Philippines. For a long period of time, the GRP regarded the NDF as a containable police problem and as unworthy of being talked to in formal peace negotiations. But at this point in time, the GRP has already co-signed five documents with the NDF.

Two of these documents, The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 and the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees of 1995, are signed and approved by the Chairman of the National Council of the NDF and the President of the GRP. The rest are derivative documents within the competence of the negotiating panels. Amidst the provisions of equality, mutuality, joint capacity, reciprocity and the like, there is not a single term, phrase or clause which detracts from the revolutionary integrity of the revolutionary forces and organs of political power or which suggests capitulation of principle or arms on their part.

The NDF can enter into peace negotiations without the GRP being able to impose its constitutional, legal and political presumptions on the NDF only because of the proven strength of the revolutionary forces and organs of political power.

Through its highest political and military officials, the GRP has expressed a serious regard for the growing strength of the revolutionary forces in view of the revitalization, consolidation and expansion of that strength as a result of the rectification movement undertaken by the CPP since 1992.

In the course of peace negotiations with the GRP, it is perfectly the legitimate right and interest of the NDF to assert its status of belligerency under the laws of war and to seek international or diplomatic recognition of this status of belligerency.

Whether there are peace negotiations or not or whatever is the progress of these negotiations, it is also possible for foreign governments to recognize said status of belligerency or the political authority of the revolutionary forces and seek from the NDF safe conduct and protection for their citizens, NGO operations and business concerns in the Philippines so long as the strength of the revolutionary forces are growing and the areas under their control are expanding.

Having foresight, the NDF is already studying how diplomatic missions and consular offices can be established in order to relate to and cooperate with foreign governments and foreign nationals.