The NDF Framework in Contrast with the GRP Framework

Upholding its revolutionary principles and recognizing its own strength and the ever worsening crisis of the ruling system, the Philippine revolutionary movement through the National Democratic Front (NDF) has amply demonstrated its willingness and readiness to engage in bilateral peace negotiations with the GRP.

NDF Chairman Manuel Romero sent to the GRP President Aquino the letter dated 20 September 1990, defining the NDF framework for peace negotiations. To this day, she has failed to make a formal written reply. Intransigently, the GRP insists that the NDF must submit to the GRP Constitution and surrender the arms of the armed revolutionary movement.

It is completely the responsibility of the GRP that the peace process desired by the Filipino people and the organized revolutionary forces has been obstructed and prevented from progressing. While the NDF desires a just and lasting peace on the basis of satisfying the national and democratic demands of the people, the GRP simply wants the pacification of the revolutionary forces and the people_to win by peace rhetoric what it cannot win by force of arms and thus preserve the ever violent system of oppression and exploitation.

Contrary to the claim of certain quarters, the NDF and the revolutionary forces through their documents and their practice have made clear that they have a consistent strategy for the peace process and that they do not view the process as a mere tactical ploy. It is the intention of this article to demonstrate the sincerity and seriousness of the revolutionary movement in pursuing the peace process.

1. The Struggle for a Just and Lasting Peace

Since its very beginning and long before the GRP paid any lip service to the need for a peace process, the Philippine revolutionary movement has always been committed to the struggle for a just and lasting peace in the most comprehensive and strategic way.

The struggle for national liberation and democracy against US imperialism and local reactionary classes is a struggle for a just and lasting peace because it strives to solve the fundamental problems of the nation and people, fight and defeat the violence of oppression and exploitation and bring about the basis for a just and lasting peace.

The strategic line of national democratic revolution is the NDF’s strategic line for a just and lasting peace. There is no other strategic line. To claim the absence of it or to replace it is to confuse the people and the revolutionary forces.

The struggle for a just peace entails as many specific forms of struggle as does the national democratic revolution. These include all legal and illegal forms of struggle. Among these forms of struggle is armed struggle, the principal form of struggle because it settles the question of power which is the principal question in any revolution. No social revolution is possible without the prior change of political power.

There can be no peace negotiations between the GRP and NDF if in the first place there is no armed conflict between them. It is only when there is an armed resistance of a certain level of strength that the incumbent reactionary state starts to consider whether it should seek peace negotiations or not.

The struggle for a just peace cannot be narrowed down to peace negotiations between the GRP and NDF. Peace negotiations are only one of the specific forms of the struggle in the constant and comprehensive struggle for national liberation and democracy and, therefore, for a just and lasting peace.

Even as the NDF is willing to negotiate, there can be no guarantee at anytime that peace negotiations with the GRP would occur. In history, oppressive regimes either negotiate at some point or refuse to do so to the very end.

Since the very beginning, the revolutionary movement led by the Party has created the conditions for a just peace in the areas where organs of people’s democratic power are established. The people undertake campaigns to benefit themselves within the context of the national democratic revolution.

In contrast with the strategic view of the NDF that the national democratic revolution is the way to a just and lasting peace, the GRP has for its strategic view the preservation of the oppressive and exploitative system and the defeat and pacification of the revolutionary forces.

Thus, the GRP demands first of all the submission of the NDF to the GRP Constitution and as soon as possible the liquidation of the New People’s Army and the surrender of its arms.

What the GRP has been demanding or angling for is not a peace process but a process of surrender. If the NDF were to accept the terms of such a process of surrender, then the GRP would engage in talks with the NDF without delay or hesitation.

In sharp contrast, the NDF has manifested its just and reasonable position by declaring that although the optimum condition for a just and lasting peace is the total victory of the people in their national democratic revolution the NDF is willing to engage in peace talks for several important reasons, including the promotion of national independence and democracy and a number of basic reforms, immediately beneficial to the people.

It is possible to engage in peace talks and probably work out a truce in the end in order to face common problems and carry out basic social reforms; or to fight a common foe and fulfill the people’s aspirations for complete national independence.

The revolutionary movement keeps to its fundamental principles and its strategic national democratic line. But in the sphere of policy, it can make readjustments and expects the other side to do likewise. There has to be a mutual adjustment of policy regarding the armed conflict and related issues.

It takes the two basic parties in the armed conflict to agree on a truce and what national social purpose is to be served. Even if the peace talks were to fail, then the people can see who has the just and reasonable position.

One may call as merely tactical any one reason or any series of reasons provided for peace talks that falls short of the strategic goal. But the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement or any other force are inseparable from each other. The strategy consists of tactics; and the tactics constitute and serve the strategy. It is wrong to say that the revolutionary movement has only a tactical view of peace negotiations.

Peace negotiations are an important form of struggle in the constant and comprehensive strategic struggle for a just and lasting peace. These are also the form of struggle which refers most directly to a peace agreement, if the other side is willing to engage in peace negotiations. The significance of peace negotiations can change from one period to another.

Revolutionaries determined to carry out the objectives of the national democratic revolution can logically and legitimately consider peace negotiations as a way of pushing forward the aforesaid objectives, in the same way that the other side considers the same peace negotiations as a way of pushing forward its own objectives. Inevitably, the struggle across the table reflects first of all the struggle in the battlefield and then influence further developments in the battlefield.

But revolutionaries can also see that short of winning total victory in the revolution it is possible to engage in peace talks towards a truce in order to undertake a common struggle against a common national foe or to try to solve in common the fundamental national and social problems. At one time, the GRP may be interested in talks. At another time, it may not be.

With or without peace negotiations, the revolutionary forces and the people firmly fight for a just and lasting peace through the stages and phases of the national democratic revolution.

2. Character of the Armed Conflict and the Basic Conflicting Parties

The armed conflict between the GRP and NDF is a civil war. It is an armed conflict between two belligerent forces. One is the incumbent government centrally seated in Manila; and the other is a revolutionary movement, with absolutely clear features that qualify it as a belligerent force under the laws of war.

As a belligerent force, the NDF has a demonstrated national political leadership over a considerable part of the population and territory of the Philippines; has effective command over a sizeable people’s army; and comprehensively performs functions of government through local organs of political power which may be summarily called the people’s revolutionary government.

The NDF has the capability to exercise the rights and obligations of a belligerent force under the laws of war within its ample jurisdiction. The two-month ceasefire in 1986-87 proved beyond doubt that the NDF has effective political leadership and command over revolutionary forces nationwide.

The NDF is a belligerent force in a civil war and not a mere insurgent force engaged in unlawful armed actions against a lawful and duly-constituted authority. In fact, the GRP has already recognized the NDF’s status of belligerency by engaging the NDF in pre-ceasefire negotiations, co-signing the memoranda of agreement and the 60-day ceasefire in 1986 and 1987.

The GRP and the bourgeois mass media keep on calling the NDF an insurgent force in order to propagate the lie that it has no belligerency status. To be an insurgent is to be criminally liable for rebellion under the Philippine penal system. It is a slightly better status than banditry or ordinary criminality but short of belligerency status under the laws of war.

The NDF or the armed revolutionary movement is not a mere police problem, which insurgency is. The fact is that all the regular services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines have been engaged in a strategic offensive against the NDF and NPA for a long time (for more than 22 years) and to no avail. Instead, the revolutionary forces keep on growing.

In July 1986, the revolutionary forces had the choice of allowing the Communist Party of the Philippines as the leading party or the NDF as the united front organization to represent them in negotiations. They chose the NDF.

It is perfectly a legitimate objective for the NDF to seek recognition of its status of belligerency. This proceeds from the fact that it has the status of belligerency. It wants the GRP and AFP to conform to and be accountable under the laws of war. The recognition of the NDF’s status of belligerency may arise from GRP-NDF bilateral negotiations and from the involvement of a state or interstate entity as third party in the negotiations.

The European Parliament resolution, dated December 13, 1990, endorses the Philippine peace process, mentions in the same breath the GRP and NDF as parties to the armed conflict and in effect puts the NDF on an equal footing with the GRP. This is a step forward in the international recognition of the NDF’s status of belligerency.

In the Memorandum of Agreement for a Preliminary Ceasefire co-signed by the GRP and NDF representatives on November 27, 1986, there is an attempt by GRP to preempt the recognition of the NDF’s status of belligerency with the provision which runs as follows: “This agreement, the preliminary ceasefire agreement, and any other subsequent agreement, or any provision or provisions thereof shall not invest the NDF with the status of belligerency under the laws of war.”

But the status of belligerency cannot be vested or preempted by the document. It is something acquired through the people’s revolutionary struggle and the building of their democratic political power.

When it comes to the NDF, the GRP is extremely cautious about any action or statement that could explicitly mean a recognition of the NDF status of belligerency. But in the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, the MNLF clearly gained the recognition of its status of belligerency by virtue of the mediation of Libya. At the same time, MNLF submitted to the first provision of the agreement which declared that the settlement of the Moro question was within the framework of Philippine national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The MNLF retreated from its previous assertion of Moro national independence but gained the recognition for its status of belligerency through the mediation of Libya in the Tripoli Agreement and the continuing mediation of the Organization of Islamic Conference.

The GRP is afraid of the recognition of the NDF’s status of belligerency because it does not want the NDF to hold it responsible under the laws of war and does not want the NDF to relate to and transact business with other states, without the GRP being able to charge such states for interference in Philippine affairs. The MNLF has enjoyed relations with Islamic states, without the GRP being able to accuse these of interference.

The character of the armed conflict between the GRP and NDF as a civil war can be further clarified by reference to the fact that it is an armed conflict between political forces domestic to the Philippines and that it is not yet a national war against foreign aggression, although US intervention in favor of the GRP is escalating on the side of the GRP and has the potential of escalating further to the level of aggression.

At the moment in the Philippines, the two basic forces in the nationwide civil war are the GRP and NDF and should therefore be the two basic parties in peace negotiations. They can have equal footing as belligerent forces.

Recently, a notion was propagated that there could be multilateral peace talks among the GRP, NDF, MNLF, RAM, SFP and YOU in order to settle the armed conflicts in the Philippines.

There are points of principle that make multilateral peace talks impossible, whether these be formal talks seeking binding agreements or these be a mere forum for ventilation of views without seeking any binding agreement.

The only nationwide civil war going on in the Philippines now is between the GRP and NDF. Definitely, RAM, SFP and YOU cannot be put on an equal footing with the NDF. They are mutinous forces of the GRP, specifically AFP. They are the internal problems of the GRP.

The MNLF is of a higher political category than these mutinous forces of the GRP. They enjoy recognition of the status of belligerency accorded by the GRP and by a number of Islamic states. But the population and territory claimed by the MNLF is limited to the Moro population and Moro land. So, there lies the big difference between the NDF and MNLF.

In fact, the GRP has repeatedly admitted that on a national scale and in terms of revolutionary challenge, the NDF is the most “serious threat” to the GRP. The NDF is therefore the force that GRP must talk to in any serious bilateral negotiations about peace in the Philippines.

3. Talks About Peace Talks

To begin with, the GRP and NDF positions are diametrically opposed to each other comprehensively, strategically and on many crucial issues. That is why there is an armed conflict between them. There is a bitter struggle between revolution and counterrevolution because of fundamental national and social issues.

Preliminary talks about bilateral peace talks between the GRP and NDF are therefore important. These can try to thresh out a framework of peace negotiations which can be accepted by the two warring sides. It is more fruitful to engage in formal bilateral talks if there is a prior agreement on the objectives, the legal and political frame, agenda, timetable, venue, procedures and other matters. However, the NDF has expressed willingness to form a negotiating panel simultaneously with the GRP and let these two panels complete and firm up what may otherwise be threshed out in preliminary talks.

Before any formal meetings of the two panels, there must be written agreement, reached in preliminary talks, on the safety and immunity guarantees for the members and related personnel of the negotiating panels of the GRP and NDF. These guarantees are agreed upon on a mutual and reciprocal basis and are strengthened by the good offices of a foreign state or interstate agency.

So far, there has yet been no serious peace talks, with a substantive agenda, between the GRP and NDF. Setting the agenda involves a struggle. The agenda desired by each side in negotiations carries its strategic and tactical objectives.

The two-month ceasefire of 1986-87 was supposed to have been undertaken in order to create a favorable atmosphere for peace talks and to provide the conditions for an agreement on a substantive agenda.

Before the ceasefire, the GRP panel had refused to agree with the NDF panel on a substantive agenda. The former simply wanted a ceasefire and wished to accomplish certain one-sided objectives through such a ceasefire. And during the ceasefire, it parried and refused any legal and political frame and any agenda other than its own.

The GRP was responsible for the failure to set a substantive agenda. It insisted that the NDF should first of all submit itself to the GRP Constitution. Had the NDF done so, then the very idea of peace negotiations would have been killed instantly. Because a submission to the GRP Constitution would mean NDF surrender to the principle that the so-called duly-constituted authorities of the GRP had the superior authority and jurisdiction over any agenda.

The GRP declared that it was willing to discuss with the NDF only such matters as modes of surrender of firearms, general amnesty, rehabilitation and legalization of underground forces after submission to the GRP Constitution.

On its part, the NDF stood firmly for a substantive agenda, encompassing items most demanded by the people, under the headings of human rights, democratization and national independence.

Aside from trying to effect the capitulation of the NDF in principle and in fact, the GRP tried to use the ceasefire in 1986-87 to break the momentum of the armed revolutionary movement, cause the revolutionaries to split and induce them to go out into the open for surveillance and eventual punitive action.

In the preliminary talks about peace talks between the Yap mission of the GRP and the representatives of the NDF in September 1990, the NDF made concrete proposals for creating a favorable atmosphere for peace negotiations and for a comprehensive substantive agenda. These are contained in the 20 September 1990 letter of NDF Chairman Manuel Romero to the GRP President Aquino.

GRP President Aquino has not formally replied in writing to this letter and has not taken any step to get the GRP-NDF bilateral peace talks started, notwithstanding the second meeting of the Yap mission and the NDF in November 1990. Instead, the DND- AFP has taken all the initiative to determine the GRP position and to offer nothing but a framework of arrogant unilateral assertions and wishful thinking for the process of NDF surrender.

The NDF has made clear that it is ready to form a negotiating panel anytime and as soon as the GRP forms its own. Without any substantive precondition beneficial or costly to any side, the two negotiating panels can meet in order to discuss and agree on their substantive agenda and all procedural matters. In so many ways, the GRP has made it appear to the NDF that Cluster E of the Aquino Cabinet, the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines are opposed to any peace negotiations outside of the framework unilaterally decided by the GRP

The GRP has refused the NDF proposal for the GRP to act according to its own avowed commitment to Philippine national sovereignty and democracy and to create a favorable atmosphere for peace negotiations by dismantling the US military bases and respecting the right of political detainees to bail and dropping charges which run counter to this right.

The GRP has also refused the NDF proposal that separately and simultaneously they announce the formation of the negotiating panels and the working groups on human rights, irrespective of whatever rate the GRP can act on the proposal to improve the atmosphere for peace negotiations.

The Yap mission to the NDF has been relatively the most serious and the most willing to go into concrete discussions and tentative agreements. But there are rabidly reactionary elements in the Aquino regime, especially among the military who are opposed to serious GRP-NDF peace negotiations. Thus, the preliminary talks about peace talks have not yet resulted in formal peace negotiations.

It is becoming obvious that the Aquino regime engaged in peace rhetoric for a certain period in the latter half of 1990 in a vain attempt to prevent the broad range of opposition forces from uniting, preempt the revolutionary mass movement and break out from the isolation caused by the virulently worsening crisis of the ruling system.

Even the Multisectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA), which tries to be a domestic third party between GRP and NDF and whose framework concurs on several points with that of the GRP, has observed a reduced interest on the part of Cluster E (part of the Aquino cabinet in charge of national security) in discussing the peace process.

On April 5, 1990 the NDF met with MSPA representatives Senator Wigberto Tañada and Dr. Maria Serena Diokno and discussed with them fully and extensively the NDF framework for peace negotiations. The NDF also expressed its view on the role of the domestic third party and expressed appreciation as well as criticism of various points in the MSPA framework.

4. On the Question of Violence and Ceasefire

Whether or not there is armed resistance by the people and the revolutionary forces, the violence of oppression and exploitation is the full responsibility of the oppressors and exploiters ruling the people and the country.

The response of the people to the violence of the ruling system is armed revolution. Not satisfied with the violence inherent in their system, the oppressors and exploiters have escalated their violence in the vain hope of suppressing the armed revolution.

The NDF condemns the violent ruling system and the ongoing “total war” policy of the US-supported Aquino regime. The NDF cannot allow itself to be maneuvered into a position of being pictured as equally violent and equally responsible as the GRP for the armed conflict or even worse as an insurgent or bandit force without popular support and without a just and reasonable cause for armed resistance.

It is unreasonable for anyone to demand in the name of peace that the NDF show its “sincerity” in wishing peace negotiations by unilaterally ending the armed resistance of the revolutionary forces and the people or by agreeing to any ceasefire outside of humanitarian considerations for limited periods of time and outside the commitment to declare a ceasefire in connection with the dismantling of the US military bases.

The sincerity of the NDF in this regard is to be measured by its steadfastness in defending and upholding the people’s interests, its firmness of principles even while making policy adjustments to achieve certain specific anti-imperialist (e.g., the immediate removal of US military bases) and democratic (e.g., genuine and thoroughgoing land reform) demands, and its vigilance in frustrating every scheme to undermine the gains and achievements of the revolutionary movement and the people.

In a speech in Singapore in June 1986 and in further statements, this writer observed that the New People’s Army was still in the stage of strategic defensive and the Armed Forces of the Philippines was in the stage of strategic offensive; and that if the GRP had been truly interested in the drastic reduction of the armed conflict it could order the AFP troops to desist from launching offensive operations and to go back to their barracks and could also disarm and disband the paramilitary and warlord gangs.

This writer thinks that his views in 1986 are still valid today. The burden of responsibility for reducing the armed conflict lies on the part of the GRP and its military instrument, the AFP. As soon as they desist from carrying out onslaughts against the people and the guerrilla fronts, there would be a dramatic reduction of the armed conflict. Consequently, the GRP would even be able to save on military expenditures and reallocate its resources towards nonmilitary activities.

The NDF has made known to the public that it is willing to agree with the GRP on the mechanisms and processes of undertaking ceasefires on the basis of humanitarian considerations, for limited periods of time, that are defined in a formal agreement on human rights and international humanitarian law.

But the NDF has also made known that it will not repeat the error of going into any protracted ceasefire (two months subject to extension or renewal as in the 1986-87 period) before a substantive agenda is agreed upon. Neither can the NDF be expected to go into such protracted ceasefire upon an agreement merely on the substantive agenda still to be taken up item by item in negotiations.

The only exception made by the NDF is its commitment to declare a unilateral ceasefire upon the dismantling of the US military bases. The political ground is patriotism and the promotion of national independence.

In case the US military bases are dismantled, the NDF can be expected to declare a unilateral ceasefire and at the same time demand that the GRP reciprocate its patriotic goodwill. It is logical that the NDF will not allow itself to be destroyed by its own unilateral ceasefire but will expect the GRP to hold back its own armed forces and move towards peace negotiations.

Aside from temporary ceasefires for reasons already explained, the NDF is interested in a lasting truce that is the result of mutually satisfactory agreements which substantially benefit the people in accordance with the national democratic line. The NDF is vigilantly against proposals for ceasefires, local or nationwide, which are outside of those reasons already clarified.

The NDF is also opposed to the proposal and propaganda that so-called community-based peace (like “zones of peace, zones of life”) should be undertaken by GRP and pro-GRP entities posing as third party. The NDF regards this as calculated to preempt and undercut bilateral GRP-NDF peace talks at the national level and to take away people and areas from the revolutionary movement under the pretense of excluding both the AFP and NPA but in fact retaining GRP authority and supporting the AFP in such areas.

Even if mutually agreed upon for a good reason, any protracted ceasefire is more advantageous to the GRP and AFP and potentially more damaging to the revolutionary movement.

During ceasefires, there will inevitably be accusations and counteraccusations of ceasefire violations. The NDF and NPA can suffer not only from the propaganda assaults but also from straining to verify the truth or falsity of the enemy claims. At the same time, the NDF will be exerting strenuous efforts to counteract the ceasefire violations of the enemy and collect the information regarding these.

The ceasefire can also be GRP’s way of inducing revolutionary personnel to relax and expose themselves to surveillance for punitive operations; of weakening the revolutionary will; and of introducing dissensions within revolutionary ranks.

The NDF has to take seriously the lessons from the pre-ceasefire talks and ceasefire in 1986-87. AFP intelligence raised its surveillance stocks by twenty five percent, according to Generals Ileto and Ramos. The line of showing the “human face” of the NDF not only to the bourgeois mass media and the general public beyond the revolutionary mass base but also to covert operatives of the enemy could produce bitter consequences.

The NDF has also to consider seriously how the MNLF has split several times, weakened and lost personnel politically and militarily as a result of the Tripoli Agreement and the ceasefires that transpired under the Marcos and the Aquino regimes.

The GRP, especially AFP, is always obsessed with ceasefires, without satisfying the requirements for a just and lasting peace, because it expects to thereby damage the NDF and benefit from them more than the NDF can. The GRP and AFP officials are feigning whenever they say that the NDF gains more from ceasefires than the GRP does.

5. The Legal and Political Frame of Negotiations

In demanding that the NDF submit itself to the GRP Constitution as the legal and political frame of negotiations, the GRP instantly kills the very idea of bilateral peace negotiations with the NDF and prevents them from starting. The demand has been made by the GRP in preliminary talks about peace talks between GRP and NDF representatives.

The NDF has objected to the unreasonable character of the demand but has not retaliated by demanding that the GRP submit itself to the Constitution and Program of the NDF.

Instead, with utmost reasonableness, the NDF has proposed that the legal and political frame be one of adherence to mutually acceptable principles such as Philippine national sovereignty, democratization, respect for human right, social justice and the like; and an open-mindedness towards the agreements that are still to be made in the peace process.

If the GRP is insistent on a reference to the GRP Constitution, then an equal reference must also be made to the NDF Constitution and Program in the preamble of any agreement to be made. The key point is to refer to the mutually acceptable principles and provisions in the basic documents of the GRP and NDF.

Per item in the substantive agenda, there may be pertinent treaties, covenants, protocols and other international legal instruments which have been signed by the GRP. These can provide valuable guidance in the negotiations.

The preliminary talks about peace talks can do a lot to clear the way for the formal bilateral talks. But in its sincere desire to start the formal talks, the NDF has repeatedly declared that it is willing to form its negotiating panel as soon as the GRP is willing to do the same. The GRP and NDF negotiating panels can meet as soon as possible and start the negotiations even prior to a mutually agreed legal and political frame of peace negotiations.

The two negotiating panels can discuss and work out what would be the mutually satisfactory legal and political frame. The formation of the negotiating panels and the opening of formal negotiations should not be prevented by the intransigent demand of the GRP that the NDF must first submit itself to the GRP Constitution.

Before the two panels tackle the substantive agenda, they can agree not only on the mutually acceptable guiding principles and objectives but also on the historical facts and current circumstances which make the peace negotiations necessary and desirable.

6. The Substantive Agenda

The NDF has proposed four major items in the substantive agenda of peace negotiations. These are: (a) respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; (b) social and economic reforms; (c) constitutional, political and electoral reforms; and (d) the end of hostilities and redisposition of armed forces.

Regarding respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, there can be an agreement that binds both the GRP and NDF and their respective armed forces, whether the armed conflict continues or whether there will ultimately be a comprehensive peace settlement. This agreement should be the minimum goal to be achieved immediately even as peace negotiations are aimed at the maximum goal of comprehensive peace settlement.

More important than any abstract reaffirmation of the principles and provisions of domestic and international laws, the agreement to be made by the GRP and NDF should create the mechanisms and processes for promoting and protecting human rights; investigating, trying and punishing human rights violations on both sides; and indemnifying the victims and their survivors.

The two sides should be able to verify compliance with the laws on human rights; exchange complaints on human rights violations; define certain categories of persons, facilities and sites which should not be targeted by any military operations; declare ceasefire of limited duration on humanitarian grounds; effect the exchange of prisoners of war; and so on.

The agreement on human rights and international humanitarian law should be so framed and worded that it can either be the preparation for the lasting truce or the way to promote respect for human rights even if the civil war cannot as yet be ended.

Regarding social and economic reforms, the GRP and NDF should make an agreement which can effect economic emancipation, national industrialization, genuine and thoroughgoing land reform, the improvement of the people’s livelihood, freedom from the crushing debt burden, the expansion and improvement of the educational system and the protection and healthy utilization of natural resources.

There can be some crucial provisions in the agreement which are effective in solving the social and economic malaise. There may at the same time be other problems which can be dealt with in general terms in the agreement but which will have to be dealt with in detail consequent to the realization of constitutional, political and electoral reforms.

Regarding constitutional, political and electoral reforms, the GRP and NDF should make an agreement which can end foreign domination and the monopoly of political power by the political representatives of exploiting classes of the big bourgeoisie and landlord class and allow the empowerment and greater freedom of the broad masses of the people.

The political parties, movements and organizations of the basic exploited classes and the middle social strata must have a fair chance in electoral struggle; acquire the guarantees of representation in elective and appointive positions; and fully enjoy democratic rights free from coercion and punitive actions by antinational and antidemocratic forces.

There must be a Council of National Unity to direct the enactment and implementation of constitutional, political and electoral reforms until such time that a new set of leaders are elected under the reforms.

Regarding the armed forces and the redisposition thereof, the GRP and NDF can make an agreement more easily if all the aforementioned agreements are made. The NDF knows what policy to take regarding its armed strength if the roots of the armed conflict are addressed first to the satisfaction of the oppressed and exploited people.

The NDF can agree to a lasting truce but never to the liquidation of the NPA and the surrender of its arms. Any framework of peace negotiations which requires the surrender of NPA arms is totally unacceptable to the NDF. This is not the only option there is. The NDF is not also demanding that the AFP liquidate itself and surrender its arms to the NDF and NPA.

Even former defense secretary Enrile has apparently seen the light when he proposes that were he to become president he would invite the Left, Middle and Right to a coalition government and would be satisfied with a truce with the armed revolutionary movement for three years and not require the liquidation of the NPA and the surrender of NPA arms.

The concept of a lasting truce is worthy of discussion and realization. But the surrender of any side is considered preposterous by the NDF at this specific time. It is better to first discuss and agree on the substantive issues, redounding to the benefit of the people in accordance with their national and democratic rights and interests, than to ram through the bias of any side for the surrender of arms by the other side.

7. Time Frame of Negotiations

The NDF has told the GRP that, as far as the NDF is concerned, the peace negotiations can be as short as one year, a quarter of a year per major item in the agenda.

Indeed, the time frame of negotiations can only be as short as the time it takes for both the GRP and NDF to come to terms in accordance with the national and democratic demands of the Filipino people.

The peace negotiations can be accelerated by the formation of working groups by the GRP and NDF for the different major items in the substantive agenda. These working groups of the GRP and NDF can undertake research, make tentative agreements and draft in advance the agreements to be made; and thus provide effective assistance to the negotiating panels.

In November 1990, the Yap mission agreed tentatively with the NDF representatives that the negotiating panels and the human rights working groups of the GRP and NDF could be formed in December 1990 or in January 1991. But General Ramos prevented the realization of the agreement by interposing that the negotiating panels should not yet be formed and that there would only be one working committee on human rights to consist of three members from the GRP and one from the NDF and that the GRP decides who should be the NDF representative.

It is absurd of General Ramos to propose that the NDF subordinate itself in any way or degree to any single committee constituted and dominated by the GRP.

In the formal GRP framework for peace negotiations, drafted by the department of national defense and approved by Cluster E, the GRP indicates no time frame for peace negotiations.

Instead, it indicates two kinds of time frame for a process of surrender. First, the NDF can surrender immediately and directly to the GRP. Second, the GRP can talk first with “peace advocates” regarding the terms of surrender; and subsequently the NDF can approach the “peace advocates” and either take or refuse the terms of surrender. In effect, the GRP seeks to use the “peace advocates” as a buffer to delay or frustrate direct bilateral peace negotiations.

Because the GRP insists on its absurd framework, the peace negotiations cannot start at all.

8. Venue of the Negotiations

The NDF has declared that negotiations must be held abroad in view of the lessons learned from the pre-ceasefire talks and ceasefire in the 1986-1987 period.

It is definitely clear that if talks were held in Metro Manila or in the countryside, the AFP intelligence services would surely surveil the NDF negotiating panel, its technical and other personnel and supporters and facilities for punitive operations.

The talks would be vulnerable to attack and sabotage by military, police or vigilante groups belonging to the AFP and GRP and antagonistic to the peace process.

The arrest of NDF consultant Rodolfo Salas and his companions in September 1986;the murder of Rolando Olalia, chairman of the Kilusang Mayo Uno in November 1986; the guidelines of General Ramos for the arrest of and other punitive actions against the NDF during the 1986-87 ceasefire; the Mendiola massacre of peasants and other people in January 1987; the admitted surveillance of NDF personnel and supporters by the AFP during the ceasefire; and the numerous arrests of NDF personnel and supporters after the ceasefire are the incontestable factual arguments against peace talks being held in the Philippines.

Practically all peace negotiations of the same nature as those possibly between the GRP and NDF have been held in foreign venues. Talks abroad have been more safe and convenient. In fact, GRP representatives have already held preliminary meetings with NDF representatives abroad in Italy, Singapore and the Netherlands.

The GRP has repeatedly negotiated with the MNLF in the Middle East; and has made it possible for the latter to acquire recognition for its status of belligerency. There is no reason why the GRP cannot negotiate with the NDF abroad. The GRP is being unreasonable whenever it insists that having a foreign venue for peace negotiations with the NDF is not possible.

The European Parliament and a number of states are willing to provide the venue for the peace negotiations, as soon as the GRP agrees. Such a venue will certainly be more safe and convenient for both sides of the negotiations.

The free movement of the members and related personnel of the NDF negotiating panel from the Philippines to the foreign venue and in foreign countries can be covered by the safety and immunity guarantees and by the good offices of the foreign third party.

9. The Foreign Third Party

The foreign third party may be a state or interstate entity or agency thereof which assumes a formal role in the peace negotiations as a witness, observer, good office, intermediary and mediator

The witness is one who signs as such on any agreement made between the two negotiating parties. The observer can give his opinions and signs as such on any agreement made. The good offices mean the assistance of the go-between in making the peace negotiations possible.

The intermediary can give proposals to both sides and each of the negotiating parties on the basis of what he has gathered from the negotiations and consultations. The mediator can arbitrate the negotiations.

The NDF has been seeking the good offices of a state or interstate agency as the foreign third party in bilateral peace negotiations with the GRP. Such a foreign third party can also become the intermediary.

The European Parliament and a number of states have already indicated their willingness to become third party and to provide good offices. But the GRP must agree.

The third party does not only provide the safe and convenient venue and other material forms of assistance but also exercises a moral influence that encourages serious talks and concrete agreements for a just and lasting peace.

There can be another type of foreign third party. This may be any nongovernmental organization or institution which assists the peace process in any appropriate way.

Even before GRP-NDF peace negotiations can occur abroad, the NDF has gained support for these from people’s organizations, respected parties and institutions, states and interstate organizations; and has thereby gained recognition for the sincere desire of the NDF for a peace process.

The European Parliament resolution dated December 13, 1990 endorsing bilateral peace negotiations between the GRP and NDF and the agreement of certain states to provide good offices are a step forward in the NDF’s drive to draw the GRP to the negotiating table and seek recognition for its status of belligerency and its struggle for a just and lasting peace.

10. The Domestic Third Party of Peace Advocates

The Multisectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA) headed by Sen. Wigberto Tañada has been the most active and most prominent in seeking to promote the bilateral peace talks of the GRP and NDF.

There are organizations represented in the MSPA like the Coalition for Peace, the National Peace Conference sponsored by the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of the Philippines, Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines, the National Council of Churches of the Philippines and so on. The People Caucus also has representatives in the MSPA.

The MSPA has put forward a framework for the peace process. The NDF welcomes the proposals for addressing the roots of the armed conflict to make a just and lasting peace and for a foreign venue of peace negotiations; and considers the proposal for ceasefire upon agreement on a substantive agenda as a positive although insufficient departure from the kind of ceasefire (prior to substantive agenda) in the 1986-87 period.

But at the same time, the NDF takes exceptions to the MSPA premises of upholding the GRP Constitution, restoring trust and confidence in the GRP, localized peace dialogues, community-based peace (“zones of peace/zones of life”) and surrender of the New People’s Army. These are being pushed by Rightwing advocates of pacification within MSPA.

The NDF recognizes that there is a broad array of peace advocates, inside and outside of MSPA and the People’s Caucus. They are linked by an avowed commitment to address the roots of the armed conflict and thereby pave the way for a just and lasting peace. They are not homogeneous but are heterogeneous even when they belong to the same organizations, alliances or caucuses.

The broad array of peace advocates ranges from Left through Middle to the Right. The Left has the basic points in agreement with the NDF and the Right has those in agreement with the GRP. The Middle has some points of agreement with the NDF and other points with the GRP and tries to use principles and general terms which are not offensive to any side. The points of differences between the GRP and NDF positions and therefore of the pro-GRP and pro-NDF positions are clear enough in this paper.

The NDF is alert and opposed to the Right wing which espouses and supports basically the position of the GRP and seeks to turn the people against the armed revolutionary movement and deprive it of people and territory zone by zone.

The NDF regards the Left and Middle peace advocates as helpful in building a national consensus and a broad united front for a just and lasting peace through the solution of the basic national and social problems of the people and in possibly acting as a facilitator and resource base in the peace process.

11. Some Examples of Peace Negotiations Abroad

If the revolutionary forces (represented by the NDF) are resolute in carrying through to the end the national democratic revolution of a new type, it is worthwhile to study the peace negotiations undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party with the Kuomintang for a truce and a united front between them in the war of resistance against Japan; and once more those in Chungking in 1945. The pertinent articles of Mao Tsetung can be enlightening.

It is also worthwhile to study the experience of the Vietnamese in peace negotiations in Geneva in 1954 and those from the late sixties to 1972 in Paris. Each time the Vietnamese knew how to work for an agreement beneficial to their revolutionary side and never missed the correct relationship between the negotiating table and the battlefield.

All the national liberation movements, which have achieved a high degree of national independence and anti-imperialism through revolutionary armed struggle, provide good lessons to the Philippine revolutionary movement on the question of war and peace. But, of course, it is also useful to recognize the historical instances when colonial powers grant nominal independence to colonies as in the Philippines and elsewhere.

There are also examples of prolonged or frozen peace processes. These are resolved after decades, such as the one in Namibia. There are those still to be resolved even after so long, such as those involving Palestine and South Africa. The peace process depends on the balance of strength between the contending forces and related factors.

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) seized political power without having to undertake any peace negotiations with the Somoza regime. Then, it would provide the unique example of an anti-imperialist government negotiating itself out of power under the pressure of US antagonism and Soviet decrease of support.

The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has been able to gain politically from peace negotiations but is taking risks and changing attitudes in the backwash of the FSLN fall from power. The political retreat of FSLN was the main prize sought by the US when it allowed the El Salvador government to negotiate with FMLN. The NDF can critically learn from the El Salvador government-FMLN peace negotiations.

We are reminded of Quezon and the Nacionalista Party negotiating with the US in the thirties as we witness Nelson Mandela and the ANC negotiate within South Africa and without a people’s army actively waging a people’s war. The African National Congress (ANC) is in the stage of opposing colonialism and racism and seeking modus vivendi with the ruling South African white reactionaries who insist on retaining their property rights and control over security forces.

Quezon and the Nacionalista Party were able to obtain the Philippine Constitution of 1935 and establish the Philippine armed forces; and yielded to the property rights of US citizens and corporations. They could successfully negotiate for nominal Philippine independence in the Philippines and US, without a people’s army behind them but by taking advantage of the revolutionary history and potential of the Filipino people; their growing clamor for national independence; the social unrest due to the US economic depression; and the international antifascist current running high.

The revolutionary struggle now being waged by the Filipino people is beyond the stage of neocolonial compromise. It is a national democratic revolution of a new type, with a socialist perspective. Rated in the history of the Filipino people or in comparison with many revolutionary movements abroad and notwithstanding tremendous odds, shortcomings and being in the strategic defensive stage for more than twenty-two years, the new democratic revolution in the Philippines has made great achievements in laying the basis for a just and lasting peace.

These achievements are due to a self-reliant protracted people’s war and the successful building of Red political power. However, there is still much to do in gaining international support and recognition for the status of belligerency for the revolutionary movement represented by the NDF. There is still much more to do in achieving total victory in the Philippines.

12. Perspective on the Struggle for a Just and Lasting Peace

The chances are currently dim for bilateral peace negotiations between the GRP and NDF to occur before the end of the current term of the Aquino regime. More than ever General Ramos is determined to obstruct and prevent any progress towards peace negotiations. His position has been undermined within the Aquino regime but not to the point that he and his likes in the Armed Forces of the Philippines cannot block peace negotiations.

Notwithstanding the current obstacles to peace negotiations, the NDF is more than ever pursuing the struggle for a just and lasting peace because it is pursuing the national democratic revolution and waging all possible forms of struggle.

The further advance of the national democratic revolution might someday compel or induce the GRP to agree to negotiate with the NDF. Whether peace negotiations are still possible or no longer possible under the Aquino regime, the NDF continues to firm up the framework and prepare the personnel for peace negotiations. This preparedness will someday serve the NDF in good stead.

As the peace negotiations do not occur due to the intransigence of the GRP, the NDF gains time to strengthen its fighting and negotiating position, broaden the united front and gain further international recognition for the NDF’s status of belligerency and international support for the people’s demand for a just and lasting peace.